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The Asiatic Mode of Production - A New Phoenix (Part 2)

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Abstract: McFarlane et al look into the nature of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), specifically highlighting its implications for theories of social development and for an understanding of contemporary Asia. They question whether AMP and even bureaucratic feudalism were systems of total power, pointing to contradictions within these systems and to the many peasant and artisan armed resistance to tax grabs and other excesses committed by centralized government.

Full text: In Part 2 of this essay, more details will be given about the points raised by economic historians and other experts on AMP whose works were reviewed in Part 1. The aim is to go further into the nature of AMP, into its implications for theories of social development and for theories of development and for an understanding of contemporary Asia.

Nature of AMP

Perhaps Marx and Engels were the most enthusiastic commentators on AMP in the 19th Century. Their stress was on the socio-economic base of AMP society - that special combination of productive activity in agricultural communes and economic regulation by state authorities. This view was most clearly expressed in Marx's *British Rule in India* (June, 1853). However, one senses that in their overall view of AMP, these authors thought that the system would find it difficult, in the long run, to substantially raise agricultural productivity, given the climatic and geographical factors that would act as bottlenecks on future development. To explain this further we will now examine a number of features of AMP that throw light on this problem - (a) the role of corvee labour; (b) the process of break-up and disintegration of the communes; (c) the regional dimension of AMP - the mode of production treated from the regional point of view as occurring not only ad seriatim in historical time, but as appearing in different regions; and, (d) the state in AMP and oriental despotism-its role and methods in affecting the nature of AMP as a whole, and in setting a precedent and style that lasted for very long periods.

(a) **Corvee Labour:** While some historians in the USSR (also William Shawcross on Cambodia) have mentioned "slave labour" in connection with the public works built under AMP, this statement is not formally correct. Corvee labour, like markets, appears in many social systems and is not co-terminus with slave labour. In the Orient we are speaking of state-run corvee, not landlords' corvee which appeared in Germany, Russia, and France and in some cases like the individual German states, could still be found in the middle of the 19th Century.

Archaeology in Egypt is the most prolific source of information about corvee labour. Wittfogel quotes the work of 1912, *Les Decrets Royaux de L'Ancien Empire Egyptien* (The Royal Decrees of the Ancient Empire of Egypt) written by K. Sethe. One quote reads: "All adult males may be assigned to one or a few communal work teams. Pharaoh's Egypt... universally demanded activities, among which were lifting and digging." Wittfogel also quotes W. Wilcox in 1889 as saying that corvee was a burden on the poorest class, but after completing their service, labourers could go back to the village or commune until the next call-up. This is far from the system of "slavery" where the individual is tied body and soul to the Master who wants to appropriate the slave's surplus labour-time for himself. Of course, later slave modes of production which did develop incorporated and extended the corvee system of AMP. Marx, then, was careful, in *Grundrisse* when he contrasted the peasant giving forced labour to the state and the comprehensive slave system of the type found in Ancient Greece and Rome.

(b) **The Disintegration of the Vital Communes:** Marx and Engels had a high opinion of the commune in all societies. They noted that communes were always constrained by despotism and by climatic and geographical bottlenecks on productivity. In periods of transition, as Russia showed, the commune would be put under immense strain. What strengths the commune of Russia had to cope with in its struggle against new tendencies

of capitalism Marx and Engels found in their study of the agro-technical works of Kovalevsky and the social essays of Chernachevsky.¹⁸⁶ What Marx and Engels seemed to be saying was that the Russian commune, apparently fairly viable, was yet under threat from the dynamics of early capitalism. The commune depended on co-operation and solidarity, while the outside capitalist dynamic and accompanying social relations reflected competition, exploitation, and hierarchy. The latter had the ability to break up the communes, as had happened in the past to several societies, notably at the time of the Roman Empire.

Another major writer in this area was Prince Peter Kropotkin. His books, *Mutual Aid and Ethics*; *Origins and Development* argue from geography and natural history that co-operation among social animals is important for their development and civilisation. Peasant societies throughout history had required villages and communes. (His other topic is the danger posed by hierarchy, not only to communes but to freedom; in *Ethics* he does not write about "Spirit" or "collective memory" in the way of Carl Jung, but about the real material life of peasant societies by region and by historical time, in which there is a perpetual struggle between authoritarian and libertarian tendencies in society.) Authoritarian tendencies, as noted by Kropotkin, were stronger in some modes of production and social systems than others - one thinks of AMP and feudalism on the one hand, and Ancient Athens and the Renaissance on the other.

However, to return to the commune in AMP let us recall Marx's words about the link, in ancient times, between economic productivity, and the organisation of agriculture and handicrafts in the communes as the economic base of AMP or "Oriental society:"

Domestic handicrafts and manufacturing labour as-secondary occupations of agriculture...form the bases, are the prerequisites, of that mode of production on which natural economy rests - in European antiquity as well as in the present day Indian communities.¹⁸⁷

Marx always looks at the division of labour and at any dynamic inherent in a mode of production, as when he writes:

Oriental despotism is in fact, based on tribal or communal property, in most cases through a combination of manufacturing and agriculture; within the small commerce, which thus becomes entirely self-supporting and contains within itself all conditions of reproduction and surplus production. Part of this surplus labour belongs to the communities that cultivate, and part to a person as tribute, a real despot.¹⁸⁸

Concerning the later dissolving of communal property, Marx and Engels wrote a lot; they saw this process as being initially promoted by inequalities in productivity as between forms, by the general spread of the division of labour, leading to imports of handicrafts, and then by the growth of commodity exchange and the use of money. In his *Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Engels also drew attention to the privileged position of some communes and clan-tribe elite as factors in social differentiation and estimated that the inequality would worsen if the initial problem was followed by the development of private property. What the internal changes did was to disrupt and disorganise a system that Marx described as one in which there is "leaving, as in all Oriental peoples, to the Central Government, the care of public works."¹⁸⁹ Without an attack from outside, Marx noted, in some regions, communes persisted for long periods.

Externally, it was the shock of modern capitalism and/or capitalist that knocked out AMP as in cases of India and China. Marx has a well-known passage about the "sickening effects" of the attack and the break-up of communes by British military force (in India), as well as statement about its historical inevitability.¹⁹⁰

Before leaving this topic, we note some objections to the picture of "natural economy" in Ancient India drawn by Marx that may be found in the writings of S. N. Mukherjee and B. Bhadra.¹⁹¹ They point to division of labour being extended to many villages - notably in the period of the Harrappa civilization (3000-1500). The authors think that this led to expansion of exchange and trade and to the further deepening of specialisation and reciprocal trade.¹⁹² Significantly, this Harrappa civilisation left no statues of Gods or "Great Men" or even temples. Other societies, however, suffered from the familiar follies of decaying regimes internally as well as from external assault.¹⁹³

(c) Regionalism: The most important point in this section on the "nature of AMP" is that Marx and others in the field spent more time on the geographical and regional aspects of AMP than on fitting AMP into a moving staircase of modes of production of historical time.¹⁹⁴ While it is true that some Soviet historians followed such a line of thought, we consider it as not a real portrayal of what happened in history. There are plenty of regional case studies of AMP in Marx, Plekhanov and others to justify our statement. We would add that the older Wittfogel (of *Oriental Despotism* 1957) got himself into difficulties by choosing themes (e.g. publicly-owned hydraulic works), rather than regions. The notion of "key economic regions" within a continent is clearest in the case of China, which has been studied from this point of view.¹⁹⁶ Details on this aspect are given in the next section on Case Studies.

Marx and Engels were first interested in the regional aspect of AMP in considering the impact of the Roman and the later barbarian invasions on conquered peoples. They refer from time to time to Tartary, Turkestan, and the Byzantine Empire - as well as to India and China which were their main examples of AMP. Plekhanov was also interested in these topics and asked why the Tartar invasion had not been able to hold down Western Russia. His insistence on studying the factors (climate, soil quality, productivity) influencing the mode of production of particular regions was made from the viewpoint of geographical materialism which is not to be confused with geographical determinism.¹⁹⁷

(d) Governance and AMP: In AMP, the system of administration was a vertical hierarchy, while within the political elite of AMP, and especially in the inner circles of the Court, flattery of the despot and palace intrigue were the orders of the day. An example of the system is what was introduced in the Northern Song dynasty and known as Ba Yia. Groups of ten households were put under a big man, who administered population census and a few other functions, and reported to the district authority - civil or military. Such groups would be mobilised for cleaning rivers, constructing dykes, and building water conservation projects by the district government or military officers at that level. Because of their unrivalled knowledge of local affairs, magistrates would also report to the district authorities, who might in turn report to the provincial governor. Vital matters would go from the province authority to the Court in the Capital.

Hierarchy may be further illustrated by the functioning of Ancient Chinese courts with the Emperor as apex. At the time of the Three Kingdoms (168-280 A. D.), there was the Grand Marshal (dasima), the chief of the secretariat [Weiwei], Minister of the interior [situ], and the chief of the capital region [silixiaoyu] at the top. Then, below this group there were district administrators [duwei], governors of fiefs [xiang], and county magistrates [xianling]; and this by no means exhausts the list of officials in the hierarchical pyramid.

The monarchies and courts of AMP were also featured by a certain dress style to distinguish the elite from the lower orders. This was particularly true of China. In the Tang and Song dynasties, only the nobles of the Court owned or wore jade ornaments which were themselves carefully prescribed: cong, bi-disc, gui-blade. The highest military officers also wore some non-utilitarian daggers made of jade.

As to the operational role of flattery of the despot, writings such as poems and songs were used: among the most outstanding recipients were Sueliman the Magnificent and Alexander the Great, while Kim Il Sung and Mao Tse Tung became their modern equivalents.

Scholars of the rule of Alexander have referred to the "Asian style"¹⁹⁸ of flattery surrounding him in the works of his contemporaries or near contemporaries, by which they mean purple prose, adulation, and attempts to inspire masses by glorifying the leader and exaggerating his thought and deeds. Among such writers concerning Alexander were Hegasias and Clitarchus. Their use of the praise Asian style is significant from the viewpoint of the themes in AMP study generally.

The sage Ibn Khaldun in his *Introduction to History* (London, 1976, p.43) has referred to the dangers posed to hierarchical societies when the Leader is "closeted," away from the masses. Certainly in AMP-China there were such examples. One was the Shang dynasty (1000 B.C.), located just north of present day Shanghai, at Anyang. The imperial, clan controlled much of Hunan province. Archaeological digs yielded much information

about it, especially its rise and fall. The technological base of this society was very strong for weaponry; their chariots had stone wheels and wooden shafts. They also made wide use of bronze for pottery and household utensils. This ascendancy in weaponry at first allowed the Shang to conquer neighbouring people to the East and West, but this changed with the eccentric behaviour of the Court who appear to have been a bunch of alcoholics and extremely cruel to boot. Many people were executed by use of a bronze axe in specially designated killing fields. Eventually, the Court and its whole system succumbed to internal decay and the guerilla attacks of its enemies.

Concluding Remark

It was inescapable that we began this section - on the nature of AMP - by pointing out that AMP grew out of primitive communism and its higher stage, barbarism (about 3000-1000 B.C. for most societies). Yet this necessarily implied different experiences in different regions in different historical periods.

In Africa and some Asian regions today, the "mixed" mode of production is a common feature of social systems. Realistically however, the best works on the different modes have, to date, been done by specialists on slavery or AMP by experts on a particular country. The "mixed modes" have yet to receive adequate attention from such experts.

The Need for Case Studies

Kampuchea as AMP: AMP-type structures already appeared in Kampuchea's Funan region between the 1st and the 6th centuries A.D., but the society of state-owned hydraulic works and grand temples occurred seven centuries later when Kings became deified.

The economic base of Funan society in the first six centuries A.D. was the production of wet rice by communes. Later, urban areas developed and became centres of handicrafts and trade. Their products reached China and South India. This was the general picture that Marx had of the evolution of an AMP society and its economy. The whole system was completed by the exercise of state power in owning land and enforcing corvee for State needs. Middle level landowners did gradually emerge but were essentially in the service of the State. The nature of the civil service bureaucracy changed somewhat with the integration of the newly-powerful Temple priesthood into the central bureaucracy, but centralisation remained.

Despite tyrannical rule, peasant rebellions broke out whenever excessive pressure was applied to get more taxes and to recruit people for military service. The importance of "big men" was enhanced during periods of war with Vietnam and Champa. The rebellions, once put down, resulted in tighter controls generally from the top.

While, as Sedov has suggested, such a society might be described as an Asian variant of feudalism, the same could not be said of the "Angkor" system which flourished between the 10th and the 13th centuries A.D. when the authority of the King greatly increased and extensive irrigation and water conservation projects were built under state supervision and control.¹⁹⁹

The historians Chandler, Kiernan and Vickery have done a great job in bringing out main facets of the history of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Some of the Soviet scholars of Asia contributed significantly. However, a journalist, William Shawcross also deserves praise for his insight: first, for insisting that the events of the early 1970s, with the American air attack and King Sihanouk's response, could only be understood fully by going in to Kampuchea's history; second, for demonstrating that the socio-economic system put in place after 1975 by Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan, while partly a result of the delayed shock at the most savage attack in Asian history, was only comprehensible by referring back to the AMP nature of the old Angkor Kingdom. In his book *Sideshow*, after considering the extreme centralisation of power held by the Pol Pot group and the furious canal-digging and water storage constructions, he wrote:

King Yasorvamarmant who reigned from 889-900 A.D. built the first city of Angkor, northwest of the great lake and harnessed the Siem Riep river. Using slave labour, subsequent kings went on to build enormous reservoirs, or barays, intricate canals and careful dams. Year by year the canals stretched farther and farther and into the

country linking every town in the land. The waterworks provided an everlasting and totally controlled source of irrigation and the Khmers managed to grow three of four crops a year... water supplied the hydraulic power and transport for the construction of huge temple-mountains.²⁰⁰

Shawcross goes on to describe an uncannily similar scene under Pol Pot.²⁰¹ It's clear that the Angkor civilisation was an AMP of the classical Wittfogel "hydraulic" type. It was founded on the control of water in an area where the monsoon is both too heavy and too short. By building enormous reservoirs and tanks the number of crops per year-long gave employment to the agricultural population. There was also the use of corvee labour for temple building, but not what Shawcross calls "slavery," since the person or the worker doing the corvee labour for the despot was not appropriated as it was in classical Greece and Rome.

The Build of AMP Case Studies: It emerged at various points of our argument that case studies were crucial in deciding all matters relating to AMP. Marx-influenced scholars and political figures have tended to concentrate on Ancient China and India, as Marx himself had done. However, there is now a corpus of knowledge about AMP in other countries of a quite detailed kind that has been built, especially by Marxists in Russia and France. One can mention in this regard the work done on smaller territories like Malagasy,²⁰² Vietnam,²⁰³ Senegal,²⁰⁴ and of course, Egypt.²⁰⁵ Scholarly study was done in Russia by Marxists on China in the 1920s when it flourished.²⁰⁶ While the more recent work has been voluminous,²⁰⁷ it is interesting that it has not strayed too far from an emphasis on despotism. Also, research in Russia continues to develop what was of major concern in the 1920s - the putting to the forefront of two major items, the condition of the Chinese peasantry and the impact of capitalist colonialism on the Chinese economy and social relations in Chinese.²⁰⁸ Ancient China as a Case Study: Marx said that AMP in India and China was broken up by the impact of western capitalist colonialism. Hence a study of AMP in China is justified because an account of the western impact must be preceded by knowledge about what that impact was on.

In considering Ancient China as a case study of AMP, we will emphasise some of the features outlined in the previous section: regionalism and key economic areas, governance structure, and the role of communes. There is an enormous literature on Old China and the world's museums are full of its artifacts. Here we consult those writings that reflect more directly on the AMP-type features of China ("Kitae" in Russian.) Among Western scholars, we have benefited from all the works of C.P. Fitzgerald (even including *Barbarian Beds!*) and from Moss Roberts' scholarly notes on the historical novel, *The Three Kingdoms* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Beijing). The Marxian camp has been seriously divided, however. As noted in Part 1 of this article, the majority view in China recognises only the successive stages after barbarism: slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production in strict order. This group of historians, which includes Mao Tse Tung and Kuo Mo Jo even want to put actual dates on each mode. There is no mention of AMP, which they dismiss as "Trotskyism." In the Soviet Union, there has always been a group supportive of the idea of China as AMP including Madiar, Efimov, Vassiliev, Kantorovich the young Wittfogel, and others.

Some people like Vitkin, Kantorovich and Wittfogel wrote before the 1927 Shanghai Revolution, and consequently, their ideas were free of the ideological and other pressures that emerged subsequently. A later supporter of China as AMP was Stepugina, "Kvoprosy o socialno-ekonomicheskoin otnosheniah v Kitae v XIV-XII" (On the Question of Social-economic Relations in China from the 12th to the 14th Centuries) in the journal *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii*, No.2, 1950. One should mention here that the most exhaustive treatment of the old communes in China was given in A. J. Kantorovich's "Sistema obshchestvennyh otnoshenienii v Kitae dokapitalisticheskoi epohi;" (The System of Communal Relations in China in the Pre-capitalist Epoch) in the journal, *Novi Vostok* (New East), No. 15, 1926, pp. 67-93. Other Soviet scholars made strong contributions. Apart from Stepugina, already mentioned, there was a study of the Jin dynasty by Kryukov;²⁰⁹ on social relations and mode of production of Ancient China by Vasilyev,²¹⁰ and also the essay by Nikiforov.²¹¹ Western and Central European Marxists, who strongly uphold AMP for China, include G. Lewin who published two major articles on the Song dynasty;²¹² T. Pokora on the issue of whether China had a slave mode of

production²¹³ and F. Tokei who had two pieces on the Zhou dynasty.²¹⁴ We shall summarise now what we can get out of consideration of these authors and from Moss Roberts' edition and study - notes of the Three Kingdoms, whose authorship was normally attributed to the Ming era historian, Luo Guangzho.

The dynasties of importance for us are the Zhou, (11th century B.C.-256 B.C. and thought to be AMP); Tang (618-907); the Han (206 B.C - A.D.220); the period of the three kingdoms; the Jin (1115-1234 A.D), which followed the three kingdoms period of disruption of unity and wars, and the Song (960-1279). The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) is relevant because it carried out an ideological purge of both historical novels and historical documents relating to its predecessors - for example, it did not accept the person who formed a new dynasty after the three kingdoms as the legitimate heir, despite what had been written.

The Han dynasty, which fell at the turn of the 3rd century A.D. due to the Yellow Towel peasant revolt and internal divisions, had previously managed to achieve a very long period (400 years) of stability and to establish the classic features of AMP. Its ruling House was supported by a centralised bureaucracy, and achieved the cohesive organisation of its territory. A vertical system of government stretched from the Court to the villages and lower classes, from the Capital to the provinces and key economic areas to the remoter edges of the Empire.

The end of the Han House led to the division of China into three warring states the Wei, the Wu and the Shu with perpetual warfare for 120 years until unification, which came largely as a result of the military victory of the Wei House and general exhaustion. Many statesmen sought this unification which ushered in the Jin dynasty and a return to a more AMP - type system and period.

Much archaeological evidence has recently been unearthed about the Jin dynastic line, as a result of diggings in a Beijing suburb, and especially about the role and activities of one ruler, Wanyan Aguda (1068-1123), whose activities were compatible with an AMP system.

Regionalism in Chinese History: Regions with good control over water supply had economic advantages in using irrigation, water storage, and canals for transport. As there existed great differences in land cadastral yields between regions, Chinese economic history was featured also by different types of taxation and variations in the degree of development of usurious and commercial capital.

The strongest regions, sometimes comprising a couple of provinces, became key economic areas.²¹⁵ There developed a cycle of peasant revolts in the key economic regions largely because not only prosperity was concentrated there but also heavier tax burdens and mismanagement of public affairs.

Among important examples were Fukien-Chekiang, Kwantung-Kuangsi, and Yuinnam-Sichuan. For example, on at least eight occasions after the fall of the Han dynasty (106 B.C. to 25 A.D.), the independence of the Sichuan ruler proved a problem for the central Emperor. In the 1960s, similar groupings, which enjoyed a bit of political autonomy and considerable economic resources, created problems for the "cultural revolutionaries" - the followers of Mao - and these regions were among the last to establish Left-controlled "Revolutionary Committees" of the type Mao had demanded. In the post-Mao era, the prominent examples of semi-autonomy in economic affairs have been Kwantung province and Shanghai City.

The Mughal Empire (1206-1520 A. D.): The Mughals were studied closely by Dr. Francois Bernier, (1620-88) during an eight-year stay as personal physician to the Mughal Emperor. His report in French was published in the Russian language in 1936 and in English (by Constable) in 1891. It was entitled *Voyage Contenant la Description des Etats du Grand Mogul*. In an exchange of letters in June 1853, Marx and Engels praised the Bernier analysis for having focused not only on the bureaucratic controls but also on the absence of private property in land and on the economic base of the AMP that he had surveyed. Sir Thomas Roe, envoy to Yahangira of the Mughal dynasty, confirmed the account of Bernier.

From the beginning, there was strong criticism of Bernier, however. Voltaire considered that he had confused Oriental Despotism with Tyranny which could occur across many social systems.²¹⁶ A more recent critic of the notion of the Mughal society as an AMP has claimed that "Even the Mughal state was more patrimonial than

bureaucratic and its centralization was more ideological than operative."²¹⁷ This sweeping judgment should be seen, however, in the context that most Indian writers are very loath to consider that India ever had an AMP phase as they think that since Marx, the concept implies a lofty attitude to India by Westerners.

The following features culled from various sources seem to leave the "candidacy" of Mughal India for AMP status in doubt: (a) The Mughal fiscal system was to collect in cash the land taxation levied on the agricultural surplus, on behalf of the Sovereign; the ruler would then re-distribute these revenues to the bureaucracy as a single class; (b) Mughals in medieval times were not investing much in irrigation, but relied more on natural tanks; their agricultural policy was to bring into cultivation waste and forest lands - in the 18th Century there was still plenty of forest land; (c) As early as the 13th Century, a cash nexus existed; (d) Rulers of the Mughal system had no warrant from Hinduism or Islam to alter or to manipulate religion; and, (e) In Mughal times, peasant revolts were common -there were not always peaceful communes at the base of the system.

Islam and Berbers: The world of Islam supplied many examples of AMP- type structures, even when "hydraulics" and irrigation were not involved.²¹⁸ While the religion itself came out of Arabia, its secular expression lay in two Empires: the Ottoman, which reached its peak under Sueliman the Magnificent (1520-60) and the Safavid (1501-1720). The Ottoman at its peak controlled the territories of Turkey, Greece, Bosnia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Syria, Palestine, the North Coast of Africa, and parts of Arabia.²¹⁹ The Turkish Empire was ruled from Istanbul (Constantinople) by a vertical and hierarchial system which much resembled the Chinese dynastic rule.

Some Sultanates were corrupt and some were removed in palace coups. The Safavid was founded by Shi'ite Sufis and was based on the territory of modern Iran while including parts of Turkey, Georgia and Ingushia; its economic strength lay in the control of a number of significant trade routes. Its presence challenged the Mughals to the East and the Ottomans to the West. Its government was centralised theocracy.

The Berbers, Muslims of North Africa, were agriculturalists.²⁰⁰ The word "Berber" is [probably] derived from the Greek word "barbaros." Berbers were converted to Islam (640-700 A.D.). The Egyptians of old (4th millennia B.C.) mentioned them, calling the people "Liba" - hence Libya. Its language of 400 dialects is distinct from Arabian. In a rich history, they divided themselves into five basic tribes which spread out to inhabit, not only Tunis, Morocco, Libya, and Algeria, but also Niger and Chad. The five tribes engaged in warfare against invaders-Tuaregs, Riff (fought French and Spanish 1925), and Kabyll (fought French 1954-62) being the best known. Kropotkin said that their chieftain system was modified by democratic practices in the villages.

Another important group in the Muslim world were/are the Nomads. Each individual featured as a group member, often organised on military lines. Kropotkin noted that they practiced collectivist pasture, with even any emerging "big men" having to partake of protection of herds, seasonal re-distribution of pastures, and clan-based mutual aid. As in other societies, problems arose when a caste-based system with patriarchy emerges. Property differentiation led to formation of an elite but it stayed within the clan-commune and exercised a conservative influence, disintegrating at a slow rate and hindering the further technological change that might have improved the commune's fortunes. Primitive communes stayed at the earlier phase and did not easily develop into agricultural ones.

Islamic slave systems have been discussed by historians, some of whom claimed slavery existed until 1950 among Arabs of central and southern Arabia, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, and Nigeria. Slaves were not Muslims, but captives after wars or were purchased in slave markets. Apart from personal services performed for masters, they were used for heavy work or as soldiers. Slavemasters sometimes bought children from poor parents. Capitalism brought many changes to the Muslim world, but the historical roots of the past modes of production remain strong²²¹ and communal values have by no means been totally eroded.

Russia-AMP?: As explained in Part 1, subsection 3 of this essay, many conservative Russian historians, as well as Marx, Engels, and Plekhanov had carefully studied the communal villages which were at the base of feudalism and of AMP, if, with Wittfogel, we proclaim Russia as having gone through an AMP stage. The

problem is whether the presence of landed property alongside the boyars and other high government advisors rules out the proposition.²²² J. Kachanovskii also wrote about this dilemma in his *Rabovlyadvenie, Feodalizam ili Asiyetskii Sposob Proisvodstvo?* (Slavery, Feudalism or Asiatic Mode of Production?), Moscow, "Nauka," 1971, as had Dubrovsky back in 1929 in *Kvoprosy o sushnosti aziatskogo sposobe feodalizma.*

kreposnichestva I torgovogo kapitala (On the Question of the Essence of the Asiatic Mode of Production, Feudalism, Slavery and Trade Capital), Moscow, 1929. Granat (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia) noted:

Although slavery existed [in Russia], it did not become the foundation of a new class-based social system. The development of farming, plowing, livestock-raising and cottage industries among the eastern Slavs contributed to the enlargement of production within the framework of the Commune system.²²³

So much for the communes. What about the other "prong" of AMP societies - the centralised bureaucratic and despotic controls? It would appear that, although the tribes and clans of Russia existed in the period of "Higher Barbarism," elements within them formed an aristocracy over time and these people even began to acquire private land. That would appear to rule out this post-Barbarism period as an AMP. From the 9th to the 16th centuries A.D., they served as military organisers and tax collectors for a Prince in a particular region, and became known as *Druzhny* aristocrats. Some evolved into Boyars - bureaucratic advisors to the Prince and, while obliged to serve in his army, had their own vassals and "patrimones."

This was the "semi-Asian system" that Plekhanov wrote about²²⁴ and describes a sort of system that could be quickly transformed into feudalism once the "social relations" set up by the Boyars and the *Druzhny* replaced corvee labour and ground rent.

A whole series of Soviet scholars denied that a slave system evolved in Russia and followed the sentiments outlined in the preceding paragraph. The slave "spots" that appeared within the overall mode of production were limited to lands bordering Russia-Turkestan etc. and possibly as close as Tartary in the Kazan region. However, these spots were dismissed by historians, except for Pokrovsky, Kovolyov²²⁵ and Melechvili in the USSR,²²⁶ Gunther in Germany²²⁷ and Pokora in Czechoslovakia.²²⁸ According to Granat, these other neighbouring nations and regions did have slavery - the Northern Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, but even there, slavery went into decline in the first half of the first millennium A.D. Feudalism then emerged - in Trans-Caucasia (by 500 A.D.), Central Asia (5th to 8th centuries), Eastern Slavs (6th to 8th centuries A.D.), and Baltic peoples (9th to 11th centuries). The entire process was completed by the 11th Century. (229) The Arabs had conquered Trans-Caucasia in 700-775 A.D. so that the development of feudalism there and in Armenia was slowed down. The rule of the Muslim Caliphate lasted till the late 9th century, when feudalism reappeared, this time with large estates and small kingdoms.

Some AMP-type features can be found in the period 15th to 17th centuries during which the *Pomeste* or "service estate" was strengthened. (Wittfogel especially stressed this point, because the strong Monarch could confiscate such service-estates if the de facto proprietor of the land failed to give satisfactory service during his annual stint as a high bureaucrat in Moscow or in St. Petersburg.) The "*Meshichestvo*" system also emerged with bureaucratic feudalism, under which the powerful lords and bureaucrats were placed in a particular position in the hierarchy. Simultaneously, some indigenous representative bodies developed - they were known as "*Zemskie Soborie*." As the central government in Moscow and Petersburg became stronger, the secular and ecclesiastical barons began to lose their privileges and immunity. This was accentuated by the growth of commodity-money relations, although in some of the more isolated regions, big demesnes continued on the basis of feudalism and were known as "*Votchiny*."

Babylon, Assyria, and Iran: These areas, as shown below attracted research from both Russian scholars²³⁰ and Western historians.²³¹

Syria: From 2000 B.C. tribes of the area began to give up hunting and to move on from primitive society. Urban areas appeared on the historical scene thereafter and a period of Royal despots was the order of the day.²³² At this time, AMP embryos appeared and remained while the Kings were dominant. When land started to be given

by the Crown to notables in return for organising military service, the social system veered to a sort of bureaucratic feudalism. Military affairs dominated because the country, lacking desert borders, was invaded many times.

The Hittites, from Anatolia, took over the area about 1200 B.C., then the Assyrian Empire ruled from 800 B.C. for two centuries. The invading Persians controlled Syrian lands from 539 to 333 B.C. and established a system of state controls over communes and extended state ownership of the land, thereby re-establishing some AMP features. Alexander defeated the Persians and Syria was automatically affected. Roman influence grew especially under Governor Pompey, but the AMP type features inherited from the Persians could not be sustained with the rapid growth of trading centers like Aleppo. The Romans themselves were replaced by the Byzantine Emperors who established their own bureaucratic system. Next came the rule of the Muslim Turks after they routed the Byzantine Empire. More and more onerous taxes were levied by the Sultans. The successful Caliph Muawiyait moved the capital to Damascus. With tax-collectors becoming powerful, another sort of feudalism began to emerge, although the Turks reaffirmed state ownership of land. The growth of trade controlled by Venetian and British companies made even feudalism untenable.²³³

An attempt by Egypt to reoccupy Syria in the 19th century was resisted and occupation only lasted from 1832-40.

Yemen: About 1200 to 800 B.C., there was the ancient state of Saba or Sheba. This covered much of the land of modern Yemen. To the north was another state - Ma'in. Irrigated terraces were the economic foundation of these places. Key products were traded including frankincense and myrrh. With seasonal fluctuations, peasants drifted to the towns. Jews and Christians occupied the area until the 7th century when Iranians implanted Islam and then Ottoman Turks took over (1857).

Jordan: Some 4000 years ago, Jordanians were Semitic tribes and were once part of Judea and Israel. Attacks on them came from Hittites and Phoenicians; 2000 years ago they formed the Nabatean state. However by 350 B.C., the Romans conquered the area. Next structure of government was the rule of the Byzantine Empire, itself succeeded by the Muslim rule of Ottomans.

Egypt: Generally regarded by Soviet scholars as a classical model of AMP, Ancient Egypt had no further communal fanning when it slipped into the feudal mode of production in a system in which Court officials and various rulers squeezed independent farmers, tradesmen, and petty-commodity producers. Both slavery and corvee labour were used to build government projects. These included not only productive irrigation, but cult monuments to the dead and other massive monuments to rulers.

Sumer (Sumeria): The ancient lands of what is now Iraq knew hydraulic works and centralised control. A Russian scholar, Tiumentsev, brought out the consistent theme of centralisation of successive Sumer regimes and the "Mesopotamia" model of irrigation became well known. Until 2000 B.C., Sumer was mainly populated by Sumerians, a non-Semitic, Indo-Europeanised people, and by Akkadians, an Eastern Semitic people. A capital city, Agade, south of modern Baghdad was founded in 2400 B.C. A class society and strong state had emerged about 3000 B.C., but no written records were then possible. It seems that large temple-estates at first dominated the social relations of production. These were surrounded by numerous small family farms. Some slaves were kept; those farmers that worked the temple lands did not have their own means of production. After some centuries, the temple-estates no longer played the dominant role as a result of the economic reforms of a powerful King, Urukagina of Lagash, in the third millennium B.C. which transferred the temple-estates to the royal demesne and secular control.²³⁴

The economy was based on river irrigation; floodwaters were kept in reservoirs, but wars were fought over headwaters. Irrigation was used to promote production on the huge royal estates and was administered, along with other economic controls, by an enormous apparatus of officials and overseers. The most powerful of the controlling states, Ur, fell with the assault by the Amorites, a tribe of stock-raisers from the Semitic West and by the Elamites, a mountain people, after which the Sumer culture died out.

Teotihuacan: From the pens of W. Prescott to Pedro Armidilla and Mexican and Peruvian scholars has come detail about the social framework and cultural achievement of early pre-Columbus American societies. Here, we are concerned only with the pre-Aztec city of Teotihuacan and its high level of culture, architecture and economy. In his 1967 *La Pensee* article, "The Rise and Fall of Teotihuacan," Bartra noted that the city was commenced about 200 B.C. and was flourishing by the time of Christ. Its semi-destruction about 700 A.D. is something of a mystery but archaeologists blame fire, whether natural or a result of an enemy attack. From archaeological evidence, it is known that 80% of the people worked on public land but some homes have been found with paintings and artifacts belonging to nobles or other "big men." Many gods were worshipped and great public buildings and drainage systems were constructed. A counting system of dots and bars was used. Some killing fields were found, but the labour force was otherwise used rationally. Although much is wrapped in mystery, it appears there were some AMP-type features in a city of high culture that the Aztecs found deserted when they arrived on the scene to build a society that Wittfogel and a lot of others have called an "Asiatic Mode of Production." Teotihuacan itself followed on from an earlier social system in the area called "Olmec," so we have a very rich history to contemplate before the holocaust wrought by the Spanish on these local populations.

The Byzantine Empire: By 395 A.D. the splits in Rome led to a new empire being set up under Arcades which extended its rule West from Constantinople and eventually included Bosnia at the time of Emperor Justinian. With Slavery fading by the 5th Century, feudalism developed and a kind of centralised theocracy then emerged. Hydraulics appeared in the huge resources devoted to supplying clean drinking water. Peasant communes were allowed to exist side by side with family farms and private estates. Centralised controls over economic and social life continued from the 5th to the 11th centuries so some similarities with AMP existed for a time but were broken down with the great growth of commerce.

As a military caste consolidated its power, very high taxes were levied on peasants and merchants, leading to a peasants' revolt in the 9th Century.

It would seem that in the early period the Byzantine Empire resembled AMP; at a later stage it was a centralised feudal system and then centralised theocracy. Carryovers of each of these social systems appeared in lands that had been part of the Empire - Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia, with Turkish elements later superimposed.

Harrappa Civilisation: Harrappa flourished in the period 3000-1500 B.C. and was close to the Indus river system. All the information from archaeological sources point to a society of the AMP type. Not mentioned by Wittfogel as a hydraulic civilisation, it nevertheless had a highly centralised system of rule which saw off a series of regimes which built many hydraulic works for drinking water and (for) cropping. The Court seems to have encouraged co-operatives, particularly among artisans.

Again from archaeologists, we learn that Harrappa and its twin city of Mohenja-Daro were at peace and no huge stocks of weaponry have been found, nor the normal temples to deities. The number of mansions and, by inference, of "big men" was limited and one writer refers to a unified government which used controls that were "extreme."

This civilisation was a largely urban society which traded with Mesopotamia, South India, and Persia. The Mesopotamian "model" of irrigated agriculture served the town and its commerce. It allowed the production and trade of barley, sesame, peas, and cotton. Eventually the cities decayed and the civilisation disappeared, probably because of soil erosion or a change in the direction of nearby rivers which forced the inhabitants to evacuate and to move in a northerly direction.

The description given above is the most widely accepted, but a Soviet scholar added much on the culture and on the extended family system. This author was N.B. Kankowski who wrote in a USSR Academy of Sciences publication, *Ancient Mesopotamia: Social History* a chapter on Harrappa in the 14th Century B.C. Indian scholars highly rate Harrappa and consider that despite its demise it greatly influenced cultural trends in the

history of Pakistan and India.

From Primitive Communism and Barbarism to New Modes of Production

Primitive Communism: In *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Friedrich Engels noted that there have been three very long historical epochs: savagery, barbarism and civilisation. Barbarism had covered many years and had been followed by a range of modes of production. Primitive communism, wrote Engels, had been splendidly portrayed by L. H. Morgan in his book *Ancient Society*. Marx and Engels as young authors showed interest in Barbarism²³⁵ because they were aware of the dramatic consequences for the peoples, their cultures and social systems of the invasions of the Mongols, Tamurlaine etc. in areas such as Tartary, Turkestan, and Mesopotamia.

A group of Soviet scholars later studied primitive communism as a form of society,²³⁶ adding valuable insights. The period of the end of primitive communism and the early stages of Barbarism was of special interest to these historians. Another source of interest to Soviet scholars was the issue of "Higher Barbarism" and what followed Barbarism.²³⁷

We know some of the answers to this question which have been outlined in our section, "Case Studies": In Kampuchea, barbarism was followed by a classical AMP system. The Russians, on the whole, like to think of a direct transition from Barbarism to Feudalism in their country, with only "spots" of slavery (as in Tartary at the time of Prince Nevsky's superintendence of West Russia). In the case of China, many Marxists, though not Chinese Officialdom, believed at AMP followed Barbarism and was basically intact when attacked by Western colonialism.

Barbarism: Now, a bit more information can be given about Barbarism itself. Historians have used archaeological "digs" to reconstruct what it was like. They have, for example, used the work of V. G. Childe, referred to in Part 1. There was certainly nothing romantic about Barbarism. Blood feuds, honour killing and massacres occurred frequently. As late as the 20th Century, such features of Barbarism were practiced by certain peoples - Ingush, Avars, Chechens and the population occupying Dhagestan. An account was given in Tolstoy's book, *Hadjimurat* of these practices and of their armed resistance to Russian influence. A modern novel, *Our Game* by Le Carree has done the same thing in the case of the revolt of Ingush and Chechens in recent times.

As the economic base of society changed, so did the organised form of Higher Barbarism. A key change was the keeping of herds and the growing of cereals. The tribes that had settled to agriculture sometimes merged for defence purposes or formed federations. Engels was interested in the relationship of the desert tribes to urban areas of Arabia. He wrote to Marx on the 4th June, 1853: "I shall take up the history of Mohammed himself - for now, it seems to me that he bears the characteristic of the Bedouin reaction against the settled but demoralised fellaheen of the towns whose religion was also in a state of disintegration." In his *History of Primitive Christianity* (published in *Ter-Akopian*, op. cit.) Engels wrote further on this point: "the urban people become rich, opulent and lax in the observation of The Law. The Bedouin, poor, and because of their poverty, puritanical, view these riches and pleasures with envy and cupidity. Then they gather under a prophet, a Mahdi, to punish the apostates, to reestablish respect for The Law and the true faith. A hundred years later, they are, of course, in exactly the same situation as those unfaithful were and another purge is necessary. A new Madhi arises and the game starts again."

As social development continued under Barbarism, a new despot would often seize power, uniting the tribes and modified AMP-type regimes might follow. Some scholars (like the Czech Harmatta) even attribute exactly this sort of development to the Huns as well as Arabians. Religion, (in this instance Islam) while important, may not have been the driving force²³⁸ in some cases that geography became.²³⁹

Slavery: Slavery grew out of the use of captives by barbarians (as well as by Romans and Greeks) and the putting of slaves to productive work. Marx mentioned that under the slave system, the master owns and exploits the labour-time expended by the slave. Hegel wrote that the Master-slave relation arose from victories of the

Master in war, but that it could be reversed if the Master became too sedentary and the slave learned new or indispensable skills.

The structure of the slave mode of production was examined by scholars, including Russians.²⁴⁰ Some authors, especially in China, have seen Slavery as a prelude to the Asiatic Mode of Production, with State-organised corvee labour replacing slave labour time owned by individuals. Russian authors doubted that Higher Barbarism had the internal dynamic to produce either a well-organised slave mode of production or an AMP, but that its hierarchial structures could lead on directly to a centralised form of feudalism. Pockets only of slavery existed - in areas controlled by the Mongols, in the Caucasus and the Baltic.

Asiatic Mode of Production: The transition from Slavery to AMP was considered in the first and third parts of Part 1 of this essay, and in the first section of Part 2. Essentially, many scholars thought that AMP with its sophisticated use of corvee (especially, Ancient Egypt, Kampuchea and, perhaps, Vietnam), must have been built on a society with previous experience of unfree labour - slavery. Others thought that AMP followed from Higher Barbarism, especially in the Middle East.

Feudalism: Feudalism has been the subject of much research by economic historians, the most outstanding being those of Marc Bloch and Pirenne, and of a number of Marxists, including, in Western countries, Takahashi, Dobb and Sweezy. There is a host of Soviet scholars whose works are discussed in a number of places in this essay, including Dubrovsky, Danilova, Struve and Kachanovsky. The attention given to the feudal mode of production by the Marxists is due to one basic reason. Feudalism is the easiest to distinguish from other modes of production by the use of Marx's prism - what was the method of extracting and distributing the economic surplus and what was the social existence form of labour? The picture produced by Feudalism was that surplus in the form of corvee labour, ground rent, or commuted ground rent into cash were the outward forms of feudal exploitation of the serfs; that this surplus was extracted by force majeure, through the use of custom, feudal right of the lord, and strong-arm methods. The position of labour was that it was unfree - flight from the demesne or the land, generally was met with heavy penalties. Marc Bloch summed up feudal social relations so well - that in Feudalism the ruling class "lived off the labour of other men." Feudalism was also the immediate predecessor of Capitalism.

There are early and late periods in Feudalism that need to be distinguished. The great Soviet scholars, Kozminsky and Lavrovsky, were experts on the earlier period - in the feudal social relations of Russia and England. Sometimes, international comparisons of Western and Asian Feudalism were offered.²⁴¹ For the later periods of 16th and 17th centuries, the experts are Maurice Dobb in *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, and for central Europe, especially for Poland, W. Kula, who wrote an analytical book, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* (London, Verso, 1976).

In relation to Early Feudalism, studies concentrated on the organisation of the landed estates with detail about the obligations of the peasant, stressing the labour time that he owed the Lord via custom, feudal law, and fear. The literature here was highly original: the main writers were the Soviet economic historians, Kosminsky and Lavrovsky, with their studies of English serfdom, some of which were published in Britain in the *Economic History Review* in the early 1950s; another effort was Morozov's, "Political Economy of Feudalism," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1958. Many remarks about Later Feudalism are to be found in Engels' *Anti-Duhring*. Also, Engels produced in 1894 a study, "The Decline of Feudalism and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie" that is not wellknown because it appeared in English only in the Ter-Akopian collection in 1979.²⁴² He went into the details about the change-over in land ownership and in political structures in the later phases of Feudalism,²⁴³ which he also discussed in his article, "The Frankish Period."²⁴⁴ Marx wrote about some of the processes of Feudalism, but mostly in the context of the economic changes that led to early capitalism. Lenin followed Marx in this; his comments on Feudalism appeared in *Who the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats* and in *Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

The main factors affecting feudal "social relations of production" as revealed in studies by Kula may be

summarised as follows (Kula, op.cit., p.119): 1. The tendency of the Lord of the demesne to reduce the size of the peasant plot, bringing it below the optimal point at which a family could produce subsistence and reproduce the means of production; 2. The opposing tendency for peasants to produce, at whatever cost, a commercial surplus and to enter into market relationships; 3. The tendency for consolidation of the landed estates; 4. The tendency of the Lord to conduct production and transport by paying clerks, drivers etc in kind (product), rather than cash - an effort to "naturalise" the activities of the estates.

The studies in France and the USA have been detailed rather descriptively²⁴³ especially among Bloch's followers; the Marxists concentrated on answering a number of questions about Feudal society: (a) How could money rent arise under Feudalism? (b) Is Serfdom the same thing as "feudal social relations"? (c) Was the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism prompted by internal contradictions of the mode of production or by external forces such as the expansion of international trade?

The first answer given by Marx himself²⁴⁶ and repeated by Dobb, was that the considerable growth of commerce and generalised commodity production assisted the growth of towns and the greater circulation of money followed. On the second issue, most Marxists have tended to treat Serfdom as the essence of feudal society, but Engels noted that while he himself had tended to do this, "in fact Serfdom and Bondage are not a peculiarly medieval-feudal form, we find them everywhere or nearly everywhere where conquerors have the land cultivated for them by the old inhabitants... the Christians in Turkey during the height of the old Turkish semi-feudal system was something similar."²⁴⁷ On the third question, a group around the British Communist Party thoroughly debated this point in the 1940s - Dobb, Hill, Hilton, Dona Torr and others, mainly leaning towards the "internal contradictions" approach. Then in the 1950s, a "Great Debate" took place in the pages of *Science and Society* with Paul Sweezy, in the spirit of Henri Pirenne, upholding the view that external trade prompted the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism.

(d) Capitalism: Before going into the transition from feudalism to capitalism, we must clear up the confusion between capitalism on the one side and market economy (dominated by petty-commodity production and trade) on the other side. The last two existed in many social formations, even if not on the basis of a unified national market. They appeared even in slave society. Capitalism, by contrast, specifically refers to a mode of production in which economic surplus takes the form of surplus value and the social-existence form of labour is wage-labour.

The best accounts of the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism are quite definite on this point of distinction - as in works of Dobb,²⁴⁸ Bloch, and Takahashi. Nevertheless, we must recognise the large role played by generalised commodity trade in breaking down the socio-economic features of earlier societies like AMP, Slavery and Feudalism, referring to both Europe and Asia. Expanded trade and the credit system were themselves the products of this generalised commodity production that grew within the bosom of these earlier modes of production. The whole process had been set going by differential productivity on the land and consequent use of a more sophisticated division of labour on the successful communes. What followed was the social differentiation between and within communes. Marx, in his manuscripts of 1857-8, noted that historical change came to relatively "closed" societies through this basic mechanism.

In Asia, the trade process was founded on price and profit manipulation, through price-rigging and "profit upon alienation." This continued for a long period, while in Europe, Capitalism, with its special laws of motion, did away in large part with the derivation of profit in these ways and established the reign of surplus value as the true source of profits.

In assessing the birth and trajectory of capitalism, then, Marxist historians have accepted that the forms that Capitalism take must be related to its underlying dynamic. One key part of this is the process of the formation, concentration, and centralisation of capital accumulation. This point was clearly brought out in the "great Debate" of the 1950s conducted in the pages of *Science and Society* (and later in book form)²⁴⁹ and for contemporary times, by the British Marxist, Ben Fine.²⁵⁰

Apart from the barriers to economic growth generated from within the capitalist system itself, we must take account of the possibility that powerful remnants of previous systems survive and have not yet been wiped out by the new capitalist processes. One of the "hangovers" might very well be a strong centralised state and on this aspect Wittfogel raised the interesting question as to whether countries with a recent history of AMP would be able to industrialise on a capitalist basis. Even if we take a recent feudal past, rather than AMP, Wittfogel's point is worth serious consideration: in India, for example, it was not until the 20th century that any major push towards industrialisation occurred since at Independence only 12% of the work force was involved in any kind of industry and they were congregated around a few cities like Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In the case of Pakistan, in 1947 (at Independence for India), a Theocratic state emerged which was in no hurry to undertake industrialisation and "modernization." As to the future, we can only speculate, but if the AMP did in fact form part of Asia's history, then the development of Asian capitalism might develop into something with unique characteristics, in view of the different historical roots to that of Europe - where Capitalism was shaped by the Renaissance and by Protestantism (as shown in the studies by Max Weber and R.H. Tawney).

Recurring again and again in the break-up of modes of production is the combination of the growth of generalised commodity trade and the rise of "big men" or nobles who are able to consolidate land under their own control. In England, in the later phases of Feudalism, illegal methods were used by the nobility to accelerate this process. Marx, in letters and Capital Vol.I] wrote about "the plundering of estates"²⁵¹ on the part of the aristocracy after the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688.

In previous pages, we have written about the tendency of capitalist dynamics to destroy the remnants of pre-capitalist modes of production, but we must also realise that for a time, petty-commodity trade and production as well as peasant proprietorship, were actually strengthened. Thus in India after Independence, some 20 million peasants became de facto owners of State lands. After World War 2, the number of such peasants on state lands greatly increased in Iran and Iraq as well.²⁵²

These contradictory aspects of the impact of Capitalism are part of the stuff of economic history: another example is when state monopoly capitalism is considered. State ownership and control under modern capitalism is compatible with the idea of a direct transition from AMP (or bureaucratic feudalism) to capitalism. On the other hand, Engels, in Anti-Duhring, stresses not state control but the anarchy of capitalist production in investment decision making and in production generally.

The processes that take place in the transition period from one mode to another must be emphasised. Thus Marx wrote:

There is in every social formation a particular branch of production which determines the position of and importance of all the others, and the social relations in this branch accordingly determine the relations of the other branches as well. It is as though light of a particular hue were cast upon everything, tingeing all the other colours and modifying their specific features.²⁵³

In Krader's book on the AMP (1975), there is much material on Marx's views about pre-capitalist modes that help to explain the transition of these modes into some new system.²⁵⁴ (We are not to forget Marx's comment on Japan as "clearly feudal")²⁵⁵ Krader's work was valuable in a number of directions: (a) He republished scarce prospectuses with occasional notes by Marx of books by Lewis Morgan and other writers - indirectly confirming Marx's continuing interest in AMP until late in life; (b) Krader took up the theme that under Capitalism, private property dominates and the state is residual, while with AMP it is the reverse; and, (c) he drew attention to the inevitability that AMP did change somewhat over time, even before the external shock resulting from capitalism. One such change was the beginning of the break-up of the communes with the intensification of the division of labour and the beginnings of trade.

The idea of a co-existence of modes of production, such as AMP and Capitalism, needs to be qualified by the fact that one is more dynamic and a threat to the others. An example was given by Oscar Lange²⁵⁶ - in Poland the new socialist state was confronted not only with remnants of Capitalism, but in agriculture by feudal relations

of production. Another example is Marx's view that the competition so widely praised as "dynamic" is of the biological kind, that it is "dog-eat-dog" in character in which big fish eat the little fish in the capitalists' competition among themselves. Later writers like the mathematician Volterra and the economists Richard Goodwin and W. Leontief were attracted to this insight of Marx.²⁵⁷ The political processes of Western countries also need to be studied alongside the "laws of motion," especially in that phase when the export of capital became integral to the system. In the case of Asia this point was made by Norman Jacobs in his *The Origin of Capitalism in East Asia* (Hongkong University Press, 1958) and by the Soviet author, Kachanovski.²⁵⁸ Finally, to summarise what was said in this section we will use Marx himself²⁵⁹ when he argued that the impact of Capitalism on a country or on a previous mode of production would depend on: (a) the internal power and potential of nascent capitalism; (b) the consequences of colonialism; and, (c) the remaining potential in the pre-capitalist mode. This is the real Marx; the idea of AMP as completely stagnant is Hegel, not Marx.

Role of Geography: Major components of many social formations are the physical and climatic make-up as shown in the case of "hydraulic" issues, but in the case of natural rainfall areas, the geographer must come to the aid of the historian in sorting out the modes of production and the mixture of modes and of food patterns as well. For example, a pastoral economy, as Owen Lattimore used to point out, can be based on plains; on the other hand, monsoon areas are associated with wet-rice production. In the case of North China, the plains allow for the growing of millet and other grains and diet and culinary arts are adjusted to this fact, but in the South-East such as the Canton province, wet rice and fish form the diet. In Nigeria, within the same borders of a large country, we have a Northern plain area with savannah grass which has allowed a form of Arab feudalism in the past, while in the South of the country, the heavier natural rainfall areas with its jungles encouraged communal subsistence agriculture. However, despite such difference, a despot could introduce many AMP type features into governance.

There is a strong statement on the necessity to absorb geographical principles when applying historical materialism in Marx' letter to Vera Zasulich which we have previously cited. Here and in *Capital*, he states that geography and especially climate will affect the division of labour and the rate of growth of productivity. In Russia, great attention has been paid to this viewpoint by socialists; the great Plekhanov, under the influence of Montesquieu, stressed the limitations on economic growth posed by climatic factors. At the turn of the 19th Century, there were two important geographers on Russia: Pavlov-Silyvanski and L. Menchikov (who wrote on the socio-economic impact of great river systems. Later, V. Anuchin became prominent in geography. Besides many scientific articles, he produced a textbook *Teoreticheskie Problemy Geografii* (Theoretical Problems of Geography,) Moscow, Gosizdat geog Lit., 1960. In 1965, the debates about adequate geographical principles and their compatibility with Marxism were summarised by S.V. Kalsenik in his article, "Some remarks on the debate about a unified geography," the English version being published in *Soviet Geography*, Vol. VI. No.7, 1965, (pp.11-26).

The Mixed Modes Issue: Engels, in a number of places, noted that specific features in each country must be studied in order to identify the mode of production extant - whether AMP, Feudalism etc. He pointed out that what appears to be a particular mode of production may be much more complex when it turns out to contain elements of older modes that have not been killed off and have dragged on, sometimes for centuries. An example is that in Africa today there are cases of communal and feudal societies alongside new capitalist elements arising from within and beginning to erode the older mode of production. As similar process has been observed in the Philippines since World War 2.

Many writers on AMP and Feudalism have shown an unwillingness to grasp hold of the issue of mixed modes. Wittfogel tried to get around this problem by referring to "core areas;" but was strongly criticised for doing this by Habib, Needham, and others.

However, we hope that we have, in this section, successfully demonstrated that many geographic areas experienced change from tribal aristocracies to AMP and Feudalism, and that even with pastoral rather than

agricultural peoples such changes can take place. This picture reminds us too, of the important role played by geography and climate in the making of castes, classes, "big men," and nobles.

Hangovers and Residuals

There are many ways to suggest that "hangovers" and "residuals" from the old AMP and feudal modes of production affect the behaviour of bureaucrats, politicians, military men and even the masses in contemporary Asia and the Muslim world. We could look at this process from the hydraulic, psychological, historical, political, and literary points of view.

Hydraulics

Much was made of state-owned hydraulic works [dams, irrigation, water storage, cleansing of rivers] by Wittfogel in defining AMP, but Habib, in his critique of Wittfogel, clearly showed that hydraulics was not a sine qua non for designating a region as AMP.²⁶⁰ Nevertheless in some countries, China in particular, control of society by the state, using hydraulic and other public works and infrastructure has been important and continues until this day, as we see in the controversial "Three Gorges" irrigation project started in the 1990 by Premier Li Peng. The Chinese state forcibly removed a million households to make way for the dams. Zhong has also mentioned that as late as the 1920s, in Shanghai there was a special government department to organise such works in collaboration with local gentry.²⁶¹

Another more recent example comes from the Central Asia Muslim republics who have suffered from the drying up of the Arab Sea due to excessive water consumption involved in trying to grow cotton in unfavourable natural habitat Uzbekistan and two other states have been forced to suspend bickering over the water crisis and set up a joint water control commission to ensure that sustainable development will occur in their states.²⁶²

Psychological Aspect: Wittfogel in *Oriental Despotism* suggested the role of this dimension needed much further exploration. Perhaps he meant that on top of learned experiences and remembrance of social practices from the past, Asian peoples also learned a value-system or developed a mindset for particular issues. Turning, therefore, to the great masters in psychology, it is possible to get some useful though limited perspectives. For Freud, Jung, and Reich were all interested in the evolution of society as well as the individual. Freud, in his *Civilisation and its Discontents*, believed that the development of cultural aspects of society is based on "instinct renunciation." This activity followed directly from "sublimation" - the using up of energy belonging originally to the lower group of instincts by "higher" mental functions that happened when the energy of the lower instinctual functions of people were blocked.

In his book, *Token and Taboo*, Freud considered the types of thinking that have been undertaken by communities, past and present: narcissistic, collectivist, sexual, and non-sexual. Freud's vision also included an account of such communities embracing two principles - the pleasure principle and the reality principle. He suggested that sometimes one of these will be replaced by the other, notably in a period of sweeping change. The reality principle pushed people for a time to accept servility to the despot or God (one thinks of the "Sun God" of the Aztecs). The pleasure principle, wrote Freud, would hold sway for various time periods, but it would also be abandoned after a big crisis (one thinks of the modern AIDS epidemic).

Carl Jung examined the development of society in a sociological as well as psychological way. His book, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* noted that we can learn much about contemporary society by studying the nature of earlier society and looking back at the road we have travelled. In his books on psychology, Jung made use of the idea that we have a collective memory of times past - sometimes many years past - which guides us to action, not always consciously. Many historians and political scientists consider that with this idea, Jung expanded the boundaries of human imagination.²⁶³ However, in the academic world there is much scepticism about Jung's suggestions about "collective memory" and an alternative view is that learning from past practice has been more important than memory. It has also been noted that the Japanese Emperor system did not derive from collective memory but was artificially created.

Wilhelm Reich, in *The Sexual Revolution*, noted the psychological but also the historical phenomena embodied

in "patriarchal authoritarianism" which has been prominent in societies. (Patriarchy was mentioned by Lenin in *A Tax In Kind* as one feature of the despotic Tsarist State and of the early days of the new Soviet state.) Like Spencer, and echoing Malinowski, Reich saw "primitive societies" evolving into civilised ones and maintained that the still-existing primitive, once understood, tell us what contemporary society was once like.

A follower of Freud and Reich, Herbert Marcuse, in his famous book, *One-Dimensional Man*, wondered if perhaps the disinclination to rebel was also inherited from previous authoritarian regimes of Ancient Society. However, this seems to overlook the continuous outbreaks of peasant revolts across the globe which are discussed in the later sections of the present essay: rebellion in China, for example, with the Taiping, Yellow Towel, and Boxer rebellions, while the 20th Century became the century of revolt.

In contemporary times, Mary Douglas²⁶⁴ has shown that social practices of the past have been re-invented and have become part of the reality of today's Asia: this procedure has been used by monks and politicians to promote causes such as respect for despots and for social purposes such as forest preservation - notably in Thailand. A big cultural event took place in Laos in January 2003, which involved several thousand residents of Vientiane in a celebration of legendary despot, King Fa Ngum. The whole thing was described by one academic historian in the *South China Morning Post* as an exploitation of today's masses by an appeal to the ritual and cultural facets of Ancient Laos and as "a hangover from despotic times."²⁶⁵ Other observers believed that modernisation and rapid change had created cultural confusion in places like Laos and Thailand which could work against the government; hence "hangovers" from the past were brought into play.²⁶⁶ In Thailand, for example, the government was tolerating monks in their efforts at forest protection through appealing to past practices and to "Spirits."²⁶⁷

An intriguing link between the old society and the present is shown in the way both old and new societies treat the heart and their beliefs about the heart, which was treated as the princely organ of the body.²⁶⁸ Many poems and songs were in the past built around the heart²⁶⁸ and even today we devote enormous attention to this part of the body - witness the keen interest of modern society with angina, bypass, and operations etc. Many political economists and political leaders make us aware that modern "Asian values" have connections with historical experience. We should explore this idea as well as the proposition that notions of collectivism and democracy, as well as of dictatorship and tyranny, have their roots in the Asian past.

Values: We may look now more closely at the issue of "Asian values." These were used by leaders like Lee Kuan Yew to explain the good economic performance of East and parts of South-East Asia before the great financial meltdown and subsequent economic crisis after 1 July, 1997. (After the crash, some Western economists blamed such values for the crisis.)

There is a grain of truth in linking Ancient Asian values to contemporary political and social developments in Asia. However, some commentators have taken this too far and too narrowly focused attention on the role of "values" in the promotion of rapid economic growth over the last 50 years. Confucian values were the favorite topic in relation to East Asian "tiger economies," and, more recently, Communist China. An able scholar, Adrian Chan, has convincingly dismissed the alleged correlation,²⁶⁹ but the fact that Confucianism was even stronger in the dark days of the 1930s and 1940s of economic collapse in China should already have warned against identifying a Confucian value system irresistibly with economic success. That a certain amount of discipline has been at work, that economic planning by the state has been comprehensive, and that "key economic areas" have been intelligently developed make more sense in explaining the recent boom periods in Asia, been made for Asian virtues. A particularly mawkish example is the catalogue of Asian values given by a Filipino author as the following:

sympathy, distributive justice, duty, consciousness, ritual, public spiritedness, the willingness to delay gratification, honesty, thriftiness, trustworthiness, ample saving, respect for education, respect for authority and group orientation.²⁷⁰

Other theories, apart from those stressing the psychological viewpoint, abound in explaining the nature and the

longevity of Asian values and periods of increased self-awareness in populations. There are, for example, the ideas materialist doctors - that consciousness requires a prior change in the physiological functioning of the brain²⁷¹ while a woman doctor has noted the evolutionary - aspect of human behaviour, citing the finding that women living and working in communes tend to have menstrual cycles that are synchronised.²⁷²

What of the impact of Asian values, then, on economic planning and growth? Perhaps the idea that some combination of centralised government regulation and consensus-building, or centralised control with lower level collectivism as driving Asia today may make sense and such combinations were precisely those of AMP. It remains true that ideas experiences, and historical roots in Asia represent an important material force and affect the character and effectiveness of state regulation and ownership of productive property. In today's world of "globalisation," these things represent a barrier to Western-based ideas and advocacy, held, for example, in the World Bank, in the same way that Japanese opposition to the neo-liberalism of American economists within the World Bank are known to have been a significant influence in deterring many World Bank schemes.

Literary Aspect: In the early 20th century, there are two examples we may use to illustrate hangovers from the past of China still operating. Miss Pearl Buck, writing in 1933, after translating the classical historical novel, *All Men Are Brothers*, remarked: [Vol.1.p. xix]: 'Today the newest and most extreme party in China, the Communists, has taken and published this 14th century book with a preface by a leading communist who calls it the first socialist literature, as suitable today as the day it was written.'²⁷³ Our other example also related to one of the genre of classical historical novels, *The Three Kingdoms*, for, according to John Service in his Introduction to Moss Roberts' translation of the book:

In 1932, Kuomintang General Dai Li set up a military secret service with a system modeled on those found in the three Kingdoms. At this time, documents captured from one "Communist military leader" showed that his favourite book was *The Three Kingdoms* and it was said that he consulted it as if it were a military manual between battles.

Political - Historical Aspects: There is much that can be written under this heading, which links the AMP and feudal periods and present day Asian societies. The most blatant example of an operational AMP in recent times was provided by Pol Pot's Cambodia after 1975. It contained other specific features - a distorted concept of Socialism,²⁷⁴ a violation of the principle and ethics of Marxism and an atavistic fear and hatred of Vietnamese. However the overall picture was dominated by hydraulic works and canals built by labour armies. These were controlled by "the organisation," a shadowy group which performed some of the functions of the old Court of AMP times. The original "blueprint" of the Pol Pot group for re-organising Cambodian society after 1975 was a thesis written at the Paris Sorbonne University by Khieu Samphan. Yet this proposal had retained some rights for the communes and villages, some trade links with the outside world, and some exchange between town and country; it had not demanded complete autarky. He had insisted that co-operatives and communes should be set up by consensus and not by force,²⁷⁵ but this advocacy was ignored in practice.

If in Pol Pot's Cambodia the village communes were set up by intimidation, in our essay we have followed Marx in stressing the communes as the most important unit as the base of AMP. We remind ourselves that they continued until the present times including till about 1978 in China. It may be seen as significant that the commune became again the basic "unit of account," as the Chinese Communist liked to call the commune, when they re-introduced it after 1958. It was pointed out by Prof. Yang Zhong in his book *Local Government and Politics in China* (Martin Sharp, N.Y., 2003), that there were many similarities between the ancient and the new communes, to which he devoted a considerable chapter. William Hinton, in his report on his revisit to Fanshen, stressed the extreme usefulness of the Chinese Commune (containing a number of former villages) as a "basic unit" in grain growing areas of Shantung province where economies of large scale were needed and the "pocket-handkerchief plots of market - garden privatised agricultural plots were inappropriate. He also pointed out that the communes in the area strongly resisted the post-Mao government decision to abandon all the communes - the resistance being so strong that officials had to be sent with troops to enforce the order, so

that the (official) black cars were thick on the ground.

In the political history of Asia, government monopoly over secrets has been a feature of the political armory of the state control generally. In a 12-volume work penned in 300 B.C., Kautilya's *Athashastra* goes into detail about the hiding of the secrets of one's master, of the art of mastering the secrets of corrupt officials and courts and stealing the secrets of rival households. It is no surprise then to see Western economists and IMF officials complaining about Asia's political-economic policy-making being opaque. This feature was also used by such Westerners to explain away the great Asian economic crash in 1997.

Under the topic of the "new Asia"- especially the "NICs" we also have to remember the nightmare world described as on the horizon by Burnham's book of 1940, *The Managerial Revolution*, in which war involving Asia's monolithic states and managerial elite against those of other blocs is envisaged. The whole industry in Asia by Burnham is state-owned or run and supports the challenge in trade and other rivalry of the Asian states against other blocs also run by managerial elite - primarily the USA and Europe. Perhaps this was an early forecast of tensions involving trade and ideology between the USA and Japan which have already occurred.²⁷⁶ Perhaps it is a reflection of the view that was already around in the 1930s - that a great economic crisis could cause both Asia and America to turn tyrannical.

However, assuming that contemporary Asian states are run by administrators who know something of their own history and that they are relaxed about centuries of experience with state ownership, centralised economic controls, and communal organisation at grass roots level, the Burnham nightmare might not be inevitable. A form of State Capitalism or even Socialism would be able to continue for a long time. In Asian states there are a plethora of state controls already in use, from Singapore's anti-littering and anti-mosquito regulations to Malaysia's anti-loitering laws.²⁷⁷ Indonesia, with a different political history, has many bureaucratic rules and a large state sector.²⁷⁸ China has punitive measures and laws against corruption. Other governments practice strict control over information.²⁷⁹ It should not be forgotten either that state control over labour has been a feature of many Asian countries who have used cheap labour in the interest of economic growth for centuries. secret police have been used across modern Asia to suppress dissent and trade unionism to further this end.²⁸⁰

The other prongs of AMP (outside of state ownership of land and central controls), namely the flourishing of communes and a limited form of village democracy, also remained in place in the 20th century and beyond; they can be seen in the barangays of the Philippines and in the Chinese communes which operated from 1958 to 1978. Some see the return to Hydraulic Despotism under Pol Pot and the actions of the Chinese government (1595-75) as evidence of the continued presence of residuals and hangovers from AMP and centralised Feudalism.²⁸¹

What about the growth of Western-style Parliamentary Democracy in Asia? Can it put down roots? If so will it undermine the communes?

Well, the use of these parliamentary forms has not really flourished in Asia except in India²⁸² and, perhaps, in Thailand (since 1990). There is also the possibility that the new forms of Western-style democracy emerging in places like Taiwan and Thailand under the the pressure of burgeoning middle classes is only a façade masking a continuing authoritarianism. A leading sociologist²⁸³ who studied Latin America, G. O'Donnell, claimed this in 1979 and others have extended his analysis beyond Latin America.²⁸⁴ A major role for the state in developing economies has been accorded by writers like Robert Wade and Alexander Gerchenkron, for which they have been criticised from within the IMF.²⁸⁵

For the future, the scene seems to be set for a struggle between those favouring a parliamentary road and "transparency" and those forces (NGOs and the like) that favour the communal way of doing things.

Kachanovski claimed that Asia is as likely to restore a state despotism as it is to follow a path dominated by the spirit and organisational forms of the commune.²⁸⁶ French as noted in Part 1 of this essay - Marxists such as Chesneaux and Suret-Canale disagree.

Another interesting, if less likely, alternative would be if a social formation emerged in Asia in which the economy was based on a system with mixed property forms and with the operations of the state sector restrained by some form of worker's control. The power of Despotism would be curbed also by ending the manipulation of information and the hierarchy of official secrets. Such an evolving system would not be Syndicalism or Socialism but a form of State Capitalism grafted onto existing arrangements. It would have the potential to thwart both a return to AMP-style society and the punitive measures being applied by the IMF and the World Bank to countries who do not obey all the instructions of these new global policemen of economic affairs.²⁸⁷ How this works out in practice depend largely on whether change towards a collectivist society occurs first in small Asian states or in the large countries like India and China. The achievement of some sort of breakout from global capitalism by smaller states could result in huge external pressure on them from IMF - World Bank institutions and officials.

The Role of Mass Uprising in the History of Central, West and East Asia

The emphasis on Asian Despotism needs to be corrected in a number of ways. We should record some of the many peasant and artisan rebellions over the course of Asian history. We show that over the course of Asian history, the masses were far from servile and quiescent and continually challenged the central power elite. In this section we also note that from about 1910, such revolts were increasingly successful; their predecessors, even when on a wide scale, and undertaken with determination, were crushed in the end.

If such reminders are not provided, a creeping credibility could be accorded to the views of those writers, like Wittfogel and Robert Cooper²⁸⁸ who treat the masses as quiescent, as incapable of pursuing their own interests. For Robert Cooper, only a new "civilising mission" can bestir the natives to fight terrorism, and "to do more" to bring the masses of Asia to acceptance of western democratic political structures. For Wittfogel, Asia was and remains an area of remorseless totalitarianism. As Habib noted, "In Wittfogel's "Hydraulic Despotism" there is no internal change, no class struggle, almost no social unrest, no intellectual or religious suffering. There is no Taiping Rebellion. The oppressed classes were successfully kept under strict watch and control and remained servile. Only in open and "multicentred" societies can class struggle occur, in the view of Wittfogel and other believers 10 the Asiatic Despotism-Totalitarian model.²⁸⁹

In the following account of the history of peasant revolt, a number of words recur with at the same time, give the flavour or characteristic of each rebellion: poverty; anti-tax; anti-feudal; anti-serfdom; anti-foreign; messianic; anti-corruption. We begin our case studies of peasant impact and rebellion with Russia.

Russia: State and Revolution: Revolution has been endemic. In 1606-7, peasant outbreaks occurred. It was led by I.I. Bolitnikov. Poverty and hunger drove the masses and they got to the gates of Moscow at Tula before the Tsar's troops got the upper hand. The many rebellions of the 19th Century in Russia were against Serfdom.

Peasants were prominent in both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions that swept Russia while in the Civil War 1918-22, they formed partisan detachments to support the Red army against the "Whites."

In relation to state power and rebellion, we may start with an assessment by a leading French political scientist: "The state, its power, and its disproportionate authority over a society which could not succeed in organising itself were brought to Russia by the Mongol invaders. The state survived by borrowing many characteristics from them and it justified its continued existence by the need to protect an immense territory which was constantly threatened and invaded" (Helen D'Encausse, *Confiscated Power*, 1982, p.8). However, this assessment is incomplete as it stands, making no comment on rebellious trends.

It was Michael Bukunin among the intellectuals who was foremost in detecting the twofold nature of the Russian masses' attitude to the state. On the one hand, Russian history records periods of quietism under the yoke - as in the period of Mongol invasion and control. On the other hand, there were also periods of popular volatile revolt, a kind of anarchism as he believed this trend to be. Social consciousness, in his view, included knowledge about past uprisings, notably those of Stenka Razin (1670) and Pugachev (1773-79). In 19th Century Russian social thought, social justice demands and opposition to tyranny gained ground in the

intelligentsia. The Narodniks, a growing force between 1860 and 1900, reviled state power. When the masses rose up and seized state power in February 1917, the movement had characteristics of anarchism - Lenin was in Switzerland and Trotsky was in New York. As is well-known, the "S-Rs" (the Social Revolutionary Party) saw the revolt as a movement from below and in 1917 had much popular support for their views on peasant democracy.

The Caspian Basin Countries: In 490 A.D., Iran experienced a major revolt in support of Mazdakites, a heretical group which wanted regime change. The movement was put down in 530 A.D. In 680 A.D., risings against the Caliphate ruler broke out under the slogan of defending Shi'ite beliefs. Later leaders were Sunbad (755 A.D.) and Ustad (767 A.D.). The next rebellion was for more social justice for the peasantry, including, in 778-9 A.D., a "Red Banner" political wing which surged in the Gorgan region: demands for lower tax burdens and positive demands for communal landholdings. In 816-837 A.D., the Berber uprising took place in West Iran and parts of Azerbaijan. It was primarily anti-feudal in character. The leader, Babek, mobilised artisans and peasants to oppose the Baghdad rulers and the power of oppressive Islam. Many Arabs were driven out by an insurgent army, 20,000-strong. However, eventually the Arabs returned and, together with local feudalists, defeated the rebel army.

Urban class struggles broke out between merchants and feudalists on the one hand, and craftsmen and their nearby peasant allies on the other in the 11th and 12th centuries. The outward show was cast in terms of religion as a fight between Shi'ites representing the upper classes and Sunnis from the lower classes.

The Babi sect launched insurrection in 1848-52, targeting both foreigners and feudalists. Participants included tradespeople, artisans, the urban poor, and peasants. After setting up communes, they were crushed by the Shah's forces in 1849 and again in 1857.

Arabia experienced a period of oppressive Islamic rule which provoked rebellion in 632-33 A.D. The rebel leader was Musaylima. Five years later, the rebellion was crushed. The ending of this movement allowed Islam to spread to other territories.

Iraq is a country with a history of revolts but not much is known of many of them. After 1917, trouble brewed with the British betrayal of the Arabian fighters on the Allies' side. By 1920, the whole country was in arms against the French and the British. Kurdish tribes staged revolts in 1930 against Baghdad, while the middle-Euphrates tribes rebelled, 1933-35.

Kazakhstan rebels emerged in the period 1791-1838. The banners were anti-feudal and anti-colonial. The masses involved were tribesmen around the Caspian sea. Some 2000 rebels attacked the Khan's headquarters but were defeated and arrested. Peasants of South Kazakhstan rebelled in 1821, occupying some towns. This action was suppressed, as was a similar uprising in 1836-7. In 1916, an attempt was made to raise taxes and to introduce military conscription for World War 1 by the dictator, Stirmer. The result was widespread unrest, strikes, and armed struggle. North of Kazakhstan in the Urals, there lived the Bashkirs. Over the period 1682-1750, they took up arms against Tsarism. During the civil war in the Soviet Union that broke out after 1917, most supported the Red Army.

Central Asia: In Bokhara-Uzbekistan, a peasant and urban poor revolt led by Abnu broke out in 580 A.D. While successful, the leader himself became tyrannical and troops of Turkish origin overthrew him. In 1238 A.D., there was a major anti-feudal uprising which challenged both the feudalists and their Mongol protectors. An artisan from Bokhara, Muhmad Tabari, was the leader. When the revolt succeeded, he seized power and proclaimed himself Caliph. A punitive expedition sent by the Mongols was repulsed, but a second one succeeded.

The oil-rich region of Azerbaijan experienced anti-tax riots by artisans in 1571-3. Later, in 1602-39, a long war was fought between Turkey and Iran. A side effect was peasant mobilisations led by Ker-Ogly aimed at both the local elite and the foreigner.

In the Anatolia region of Turkey, history records the Jelali rebellion of 1595-1603. The target was the Turkish Sultanate and the aim was to recover lost lands. The peasants and lower landowners from smaller estates

joined the struggle.

The Guria region of East Georgia faced rebellion when monetisation of taxes was introduced in May 1841. Peasants refused to pay or co-operate initiating a conflict with local fiefs and Tsarist officials. At first, 7000 rebels defeated Colonel Brusilov's troops but were later overwhelmed. In the 1905 great revolution which swept Russia, Georgian peasants also actively supported revolt until put down by the forces of Colonel Krylov. A volatile part of Georgia was the province of Mingrelia, located next to Abkhazia, a Caucasian state. Uta Mikova, a blacksmith, led a rising against Serfdom in the 1840s, refusing taxation levies and other feudal obligations. A temporary government was set up, which fixed the price of essential goods and cleaned up the judicial system, before being crushed by Tsarist troops and armed men recruited by local landlords.

Armenia is a Christian country in an area where Muslims populate the surrounding republics. It has been repeatedly attacked by Turks and Persians. In 1827, Tsarist Russia grabbed the region. On November 29, 1920, a full-scale revolt against the Dashnak dictatorship was supported by peasants, workers and the Red Army. Counter-revolutionaries were at first successful, but by April 1921, the Whites had been driven out. The description, Turkestan, refers to an area that has included Turkmenia, Khirgistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikstan. In the 1880s and in 1890, there was brewing unrest in the area. In 1898 the mood boiled over into anti-Tsar riots known as the Andizhan. This time the leaders were Mullahs and local feudalists who encouraged the masses to fight a "Jihad." They wanted to re-establish the Kokhand Khanate and old-style local Feudalism. Some peasants, cattle-raisers and workmen were drawn into this struggle but only 2000 of the insurgents were armed, inviting successful counter-revolution.

The Northern region of Azerbaijan is called Daghasan which also adjoins Chechnya. It became a Russian protectorate after 1813. From 1834 to 1859 a number of rebellious Mullahs attacked Tsarism and declared themselves Imams. Their revolt aimed to set up an independent theocratic-military state. Tribesman harassed occupying Russian troops until the 1860s. On the northern slopes of the central Caucasus there is a region known as Kabada-Balkaria. They joined Russia to get protection from Tartars and Mongols, but with the growth of taxes and feudal obligations, they resorted to rebellion in 1806, 1824-5 and 1854. In 1905, the peasants torched large houses and seized some of the big estates. They were suppressed, but rose again in 1917. Between Georgia and the Russian Black Sea, there is Abkazia, where tribal uprisings were common. In 1866, a large scale revolution against the Tsar's attempt to introduce reforms had been put down, with Christians being deported to Siberia and many Sunni Muslims to Turkey.

In Tadjikstan, what became known as the Kokand Rebellion occurred in 1872-76, with smaller disturbances breaking out until 1886. Primarily anti-Tsarist in this phase in the year 1888 witnessed a wider conflict when Vose, a peasant leader, headed an insurgent army of thousands which, however, was defeated by the Emir's forces. In 1906, in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution which spread across Russia, unrest and skirmishes with Tsarist troops occurred. In 1913, an order from the Tsar mobilising people for War was met with armed resistance across Central Asia. Some 300 rebels were executed.

Other Areas of Peasant Revolt: In relation to India, only a few of the many rebellions will be mentioned here. In 1669, there was a peasant insurrection movement in the North against the Mughal rulers, led by a rebel, Golkar. Known as the Jai Peasant Revolt, it was crushed by King Aurengzeb, who executed the leaders. What the British call "the mutiny" and what Indians call the "liberation war" arose from disaffection by Sepoy troops in 1856. By 1857, there was rebellion by them in Lucknow followed by a march to Delhi. Because Calcutta forces did not join the rebellion, the Sepoys in Delhi were exposed to counter-attack. In the 1870s, V.B. Phadke led peasant detachments in attacking landlords and moneylenders in the region of Maharashtra. He tried unsuccessfully to hire professional soldiers. Captured, he was exiled for life in Aden. In Marathi a peasant rebellion broke out in 1873-5 and again in 1878-9, while the Telegen peasants followed suit in 1879-80. The Moplak Rebellion of 1921 involved Moplak, a Muslim sect centered around Ponnani (today's Malabar-Cochin in Kerala). It broke out after British troops attacked a Mosque, and turned into a general rising against Hindu

landowners once the Muslims were supported by Hindu tenant farmers. After a period of success, they were eventually forced to surrender. The second Telegu revolt 1946-50 was a very big affair that shook national politics. After a good crop in 1946-7, the Nizam of Hyderabad tried to seize the "excess" grain, but the peasants themselves blocked his efforts and his minions. The movement was led by two groups - the "Andhra Maraba" and the communist party. The rebels confiscated 1.2million acres for re-distribution to poor farmers, formed militia detachments, reformed the Courts, and introduced compulsory education in the primary schools. Fearing a separation of Telegana from the Indian Union, Nehru, perhaps reluctantly, used the Indian army to force a surrender but guerrilla activity continued for two more years.

Concerning revolution in China, much has been written by bourgeois and Russian scholars. Many start with the Liu Pang uprising against the Chin dynasty, 209-206 B.C. All emphasise the "Red Eyebrows" Rebellion of 17-27 A.D. when the Red Eyebrows and their allies defeated a force of 100,000 troops. In 27 A.D. they advanced on the Imperial Capital and put a shepherd on the throne. They were eventually defeated by Liu Hsiu, a noble who proclaimed himself Emperor - the Han Emperor. From 750 A.D. to 763A.D., there occurred the "Aniushan" revolt. A petty-trader in salt, Wang Hsieh Chin, led an uprising in Shantung and occupied a number of cities. From 1351 to 1368, a rebellion against the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty became widespread. Some call it "red towels" rebellion. Anti-feudal demands were made at first, but these were dropped in the interests of those wanting unity in driving out the Mongols. The goal of this movement was largely achieved with the storming of Tatu - then the Mongol capital in 1368 A.D.

A postal courier, Li Tsu Ching, led a revolt during 1628-1644 in the area of Sian; he was proclaimed Emperor in 1644, the year of the fall of the Ming dynasty.

The Taiping Rebellion is well-known to all students of China. Its origins were in the Nien rising in North China of 1852-68 and merged with it to form a wider area of discontent: rebellion spread to Kiangsi and Northern Honan. Poverty and an unpopular dynasty fed the discontent, for the Taiping Rebellion was part of an anti-foreign and anti-Manchu movement. The leaders included some liberal landowners and some of the urban bourgeoisie, who resented higher tax burdens. Schools and commercial establishments were boycotted. Fired on, the participants spread their message and won many battles against Imperial troops. The throne collapsed in October 1911 and a Republic ensued.

Mass Revolt in More Modern Times: After a series of rebellions in countryside and towns in the Soviet Republic against the "White" armies in 1918-22, there followed almost immediately similar revolts in China and other places, including northern Italy and Hungary. We note, too, that after war ended in 1919, civilian populations and exservicemen of Western Europe returned to business as usual without too much complaint. It was very different further East: the protests were strong in Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania. In Hunan province in China in 1926, a massive peasant revolt got under way, which so alarmed Chiang Kai-shek that he abandoned any flirtation with the Left and threw in his lot with the Right. A year later, a million died at his hand in the Shanghai Worker's rebellion.

The second World War was followed by the Yugoslav national liberation uprising led by Tito, revolt in Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania as well as partisan movements in France and Italy that were able to greatly influence national policy although sabotaged electorally by US agents.

Outstanding leaders were produced by the movements so far listed. Apart from Tito and Dmitriev, there were the soldiers who fought in the various campaigns in favour of the Reds. Blucher, a Soviet citizen and general of the army was one such example; he led his men to victory after victory against the "White," and invaders of the Soviet territories in 1918-22, and assisted in the defence of the Far Eastern Republic against Japanese invaders in 1921-2. He went on to play a big role in the victories of the Chinese left peasant and soldiers in the Eastern and Northern Expeditions in China.

From 1944, Vietnam began its successful 30-year national liberation war against Japanese, French, and American imperialism, having experienced centuries of resistance to Chinese vassalage and peasant revolts

against the local elite. Revolution in Laos and Cambodia was also successful in 1975. China's successful revolution against Feudalism, remnants of AMP and bureaucrat Capitalism ended in 1949.

In 1958-9 Cuban rebels under Castro and Gueverra succeed in wresting power from the dictator attempted invasion organised by successive American governments.

Wittfogel and other purveyors of the "Totalitarian model" have to explain all this rebellious activity. We agree with Habib's comment²⁹⁰ that "hydraulic despotism" alone cannot describe the social relations in AMP and centralised feudalism for such a description leaves out the whole history of peasant masses in insurrectionary mood and mode.

Wittfogel's 1957 advocacy of Asia as totalitarian was followed by the writings in similar vein against non-capitalist societies by Samuel Huntington and other believers in totalitarian "models." Robert Cooper's book reiterates this standpoint, while adding calls for a civilising mission by the West to correct the recalcitrants.

Conclusion

In this essay, we have given much attention to the broad-rush generalisations of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and the earlier travelers to Asia like Bernier. We have discussed the debates about the Asiatic Mode of Production in the USSR, China, Britain, France, Hungary and other countries. Next we have added detail about individual histories of countries, accounts which we have called "case studies." In our section on "hangovers and residuals" we have also taken up Wittfogel's suggestion to include some discussion of the effects of the older modes of production in Asia, on the psychology of the masses and of public officials educated to rule a centralised system, including patterns of civil society, bureaucratic corruption etc. The gaps we could not completely fill, so we are hopeful others will continue research on AMP. In particular, it would seem useful to establish limitations on possible "candidates" for AMP status and also which countries turn out to be rather complex mixtures of modes of production (e.g. Barbarism plus AMP; AMP-in-decline plus "centralised feudalism;" AMP plus Capitalism, etc.).

In our review of the literature and the use of AMP by various writers, we have sought to show that the AMP is not only interesting as a mode of production but that it ought also to be seen within the wider framework of pre-capitalist social formations. This point had gotten lost in the 1931 Leningrad debate and only came strongly to the fore when Eric Hobsbawm and then Ter-Akopian in Moscow edited in the English language many previously untapped works of Marx and Engels on these formations, including AMP. In all our arguments, we have kept in mind what Dr. Joseph Needham emphasised in his review (*Science and Society*, 1959) of Wittfogel: that AMP was a "characteristic and individual form of society of independent status parallel with Feudalism and Capitalism."

As noted at the end of Part 1, we have considered it worthwhile, for reasons given there, to look at books and articles of the "Marxological" kind, the outstanding ones being Danilova's 80-page essay introducing the 1968 conference organized by Ter-Akopian and herself, and Marian Sawyer's 1977 book, *Marxism and the Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production*. We followed closely the stimulating research done by Soviet and French writers, in particular, while we have re-investigated many of the older histories about Ancient China - its rich culture and government structures of 3000 years ago.

We have also given a detailed account above of resistance, rebellion, and death as experienced by peasant masses over centuries, as they fought in opposition to tyranny in AMP and other social formations. This was necessary to get a balanced picture of daily life under AMP.

Marx's views were inevitably to the fore in our discussions about AMP or his summary of the issues was lucid and penetrating: the emphasis on the absence of private property, the economic base of communal agriculture and crafts, the erosive effects of commerce, division of labour and differences in land per person productivity in breaking down the AMP system. We noted two things about Marx, in particular, that he was writing about reasonably recent AMP (India and China of the 18th and 19th centuries), and not about the remote past; moreover, that Marx stuck to his views about the political economy of various pre-capitalist economic formations

- and especially AMP - right to the end of his life. His ethnographic notebooks unearthed in the 1960s are, alone, a proof of that fact.

In examining these aspects of the economic history of Asia, we have had to traverse many conflicting opinions concerning individual examples of AMP, about the role of AMP in the Marxian system and about the implications of the past for contemporary Asian values and practices. However, this article has not been a re-working of Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism, which came out nearly 50 years ago. It is really a study of postWittfogel research, and an account of the influence which he exerted and the inevitable counter-critiques that his controversial views unleashed. We have paid due respect to his insights of linking despotism to, in many cases, hydraulic needs of society. However, we have questioned whether AMP and even "bureaucratic feudalism" were systems of total power, pointing to contradictions within these systems and to the many peasant and artisan armed resistance to tax grabs and other excesses committed by centralised government.

Notes

186. Marx and Engels both praised Chernichevskii as a great writer on social questions (see Marx, Letter to the editorial board of *Otechestvennie Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes) in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., p. 294; Engels, "Afterward" to *Social Relations in Russia* in Ter Akopian, op. cit., 472-6. For a Russian view there is an early article in the Soviet Union by I. Krekov, "N.G. Chernichevskii o krestyankoi pozemlyenov obshchine" (Chernichevskii on questions of society), *Istorik Marksist*, Vol. 14, 1929.
187. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1857-8" in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., pp. 87-136.
188. Ibid. 189. Marx, "British Rule in India," (written 10 June 1853, published in *New York Tribune*, 20 June, 1853, republished in Ter-Akopian op. cit.
190. Ibid.
191. Mukherjee, S.N., Sir William Jones and Bhadra, Bulla, *Materialist Orientalism*, are the main examples for this paragraph's suggestion.
192. Ibid.
193. Harrappa civilization is referred to in the text above.
194. As noted earlier, Marx used the term "commune" in a number of senses: there was the initial earlier period of unity of the peasants grouped in the commune, then the beginnings of disintegration and the detachment of plots of land to private owners; finally, there was the Germanic model where the commune existed as a supplement or adjunct to private landholding. Marx was aware of the threat of social differentiation as well as the limits imposed by climate and geography on the viability of communes.
195. Chodorov, I., "K voprosy o istoricheskoi evolucii zemlevladnenie v Turkestane," *Istorik Marksist*, No. 10, 1925.
196. Chi Chia-Ting, *Key Economic Regions in Chinese History*, New York, 1936.

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197. The trend to "geographical determinism" in some of the writings of neo-Marxists was criticised by Sheila Smith in her article "Class Analysis versus World Systems Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 12, No.1, 1982.
198. Davidson, James, Review of *Alexander the Great* by E. Bodnam and A. Booworth, *London Review of Books*, 1 November, 2001, p. 7.
199. After studying the books of Shawcross (*Sideshow*) and Russel Ross (ed.), *Cambodia Country Study*, we consider the case for treating Cambodia as a "classical" AMP to be overwhelming. However, for a criticism of this approach see the article by a Russian scholar writing in French - Sedov, L., "La société Angkorienne et le problème mode de production asiatique," (*Angkor Society and the Problem of the Asiatic Mode of Production*) *La Pensee*, No. 138, 1968.
200. Shawcross, W., *Sideshow*, pp. 376ff.
201. Ibid.
202. Boiteau, P., "Les droits sur la terre dans la société Malagasy," (*Land Rights in Malagasy Society*), *La Pensee*, No. 117, 1964.
203. For Vietnam there were two good pieces penned by Nguyen Khac Vien: an article in 1979 in the *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (Vol. 10, pp. 240-9 entitled "Historical Research in Vietnam" and his 1986 book in English, *Vietnam: A Long History* (Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House). Also note the writings in French of those Vietnamese scholars who consider Vietnam to have passed through an AMP stage: Nguyen Long Bich, "Le mode production asiatique dans l'histoire du Vietnam," *Recherches Internationales*, Nos. 57-58, 1967 and Khoi Le Tan, "Contribution à l'étude mode de production asiatique: le Vietnam antique," *La Pensee*, No. 171, 1973. A French historian of Vietnam, J. Chesneau, also published *Contribution à l'histoire de la nation vietnamienne* (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1954), also re-issued as a renamed volume, in English - *The Vietnamese Nation* (Sydney, Current Books, 1966).
204. Senegal attracted attention in the work of Ly, B., "Les classes sociales dans Le Senegal pre-colonial," *Cahiers du CERM*, No. 60, 1969 and in the identically named article by Deme, K., "Les classes sociales dans le Senegal pre-colonial," *La Pensee*, No. 130, 1966.
205. Avided, V "Selykaya obshchina i iskvuence orochenniye v drevnem Egiptene" (Peasant Communes and Experiences of Oppression in Ancient Egypt), *Istoriik Marksist*, No.6, 1934; Savelyeva, T., *Agrarnii stroi Egipta v periode drevnego carstva*, (*Agrarian Regimes of Egypt at the Time of the Ancient Kings*), Moscow, 1962; Struve, V., *Krestomatia po istorii drevnego Egipta*, (*Introduction to a History of Ancient Egypt*), Moscow, 1966; Saad, A., "L'egypte pharaonique" (Egypt of the Pharaohs), *Cahiers du CERM*, No. 122, 1975; Saad, A., "Le mode de production asiatique et les problèmes de la formation sociale égyptienne" (The Asiatic Mode of Production and the Problem of the Social Formation in Egypt), *La Pensee*, No. 189, 1976; Majewski, K., La question mode de production asiatique dans la civilization égyptienne à la lumière des sources archéologiques" (The Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production in Egyptian Civilisation in the Light of Archeological Sources), *Cahiers du CERM*, No. 70, 1970.
206. As pointed out in the text above, China became a centre of scholarly and political attention in the USSR and the Comintern in the 1920s, with contributions from Ryazanoff, Madiar, Varga, Wittfogel and others. L. Madiar's book of 1928, *Ekonomika Selyskog Hozyaystva v Kitae* (*Agrarian Economy in China*) was the most discussed contribution at that time. By contrast, a study of China's Sinkiang province denounced the use of AMP as a model for interpreting the region; this work was Kokin, M.D., and Papayan, *Tsin-tian: agrarni stroi drevnego Kitaya* (Sinkiang: Agrarian Region of Ancient China), Moscow, 1930.
207. A longer list is needed for later Marxist-influenced work on ancient China. Among those who favoured the AMP interpretation were Lewin, G., "Les formations sociales dans l'histoire de Chine," *Recherches Internationales*, No. 57-8, 1967; Duman, "K voprosu socialno-ekonomicheskogo stoe Kitaya v III do IV n.e." (On the Question of the Socio-economic Regime in China from the 4th to the 3rd centuries B.C.), *Voprosy Istarii*, No.2, 1957; Vasiliyev, I.S., *Agrarne otnosheniya v obshchina v drevnem Kitaye* (*Agrarian Relations in the Society of Ancient China*), Moscow, 1959 and Tokai, F., "Le mode de production asiatique en Chine," (The Asiatic Mode of Production in China), *Recherches Internationales*, No. 57-8, 1967. Other Marx-influenced publications were Needham, J., *Science and Civilisation in China*, Cambridge, 1974; Stepugina, T., "K voprosy o socialno-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniya v Kitaya v XIV-XII vv do n.e." (On the Question of the Socio-economic Relations in China from the 14th to the 12th Century

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- B.C.), *Vestnik drevnei istorii* (*Journal of Ancient History*), Moscow, No.2, 1950; Kryukov, M., "Rod I gosudarstvo v Ynskome Kitaye" (People and Government in Jin Dynasty China), *Vestnik drevnei istorii*, No.2, 1965.
208. The issue of a systematic comparison, historically, concerning the social and political behaviour of the peasantry in Western Europe and the East would be very valuable. In this essay we have already given many French and Soviet sources concerning the peasants of the East; however, there are two sources on the Western peasantry that can be mined. The first is the excellent but ineptly titled *Marx Against the Peasantry* by David Mitrany, which has a very comprehensive bibliography on the peasant question. The second source is the encyclopedic yet little-known monograph by Henry Mayer, published in the English language, but by a French Institute: Mayer, Henry, *Marx, Engels and the Politics of the Peasantry* (*Cahiers ISEA*, 102, Serle, No.3, June 1960). In the Soviet studies of China there were two themes that were stressed from the 1920s onwards: the social existence form of peasant labour and the impact of Capitalist colonialism on the peasantry. Y. Kantorovich began this trend with his essay, "Sistem obshchestvennykh otnosheni v Kitae do-kapitalistichkoi" (System of Social Relations in the Communes of Pre-capitalist China), *Novi Vostok* (The New East), No.15, 1926, while Volin contributed "Basic Questions About Agrarian Society in China," also in *Novi Vostok*, Nos. 10-11, 1926. The impact on the rural sector of Colonialism was discussed in Chapter 1 of L. Madiar's book, *Agrarian Economy of China*, Moscow, 1928.
209. Kryukov, M., "Rod i Gosudarstvo v Ynskome Kitae," (People and State in the China of the Jin), *Vestnik drevnei istorii* (*Journal of Ancient History*), No.2, 1965.
210. Vasiliyev, I. S. *Agrarne otnosheniya v obshchina v drevnem kitae* (*Agrarian Social Relations in the Communes of Ancient China*), Moscow, 1959.
211. Nikiforov, N. V., *Sovetskii istoriki o problemakh Kitaya*, (Soviet Historians on the Problem of China) Moscow, Nauka, 1970.
212. Lewin, G. *Der Ersten Funtzig Jahre der Song-Dynastie*, Berlin, 1973; see also Lewin, "Les formations sociales dans l'histoire de Chine, (Social Formations in the History of China), *Recherches Internationales*, No.57-8, 1967. Lewin saw the Song dynasty as an AMP society - as can also be seen in his article, "Von der 'asiatischen produktionweise zur 'hydraulic society'" (On the AMP and 'Hydraulic Society'), *Jarbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeachichte*, Vol.IV, 1967.
213. Pokora, T., "Gab es in der geschichte Chines eine darch sklaverei bestimmte produktionsweise undgesellschaftsformation," *Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte der alten Welt*, No.1, 1964.
214. Tokai, F., "Le MPA en Chine" (The AMP in China), *Recherches Internationales* No.57-8, 1967; "Le MPA dans l'oeuvre de K. Marx et F. Engels," (The AMP in the Work of Marx and Engels), *La Pensee*, No. 114, 1964. Tokai's "case study" was the Zhou dynasty as in Tokai, "Les Conditions e la propriete fonciere dans la Chine de l'epoque Tseou," *Acta Antiqua*, Budapest, Vol. 6, 1958.
215. Chi Chia-Ting, *Key Economic Regions in Chinese History*, N.Y., 1936.
216. The relevant work of Voltaire here was "Fragmentes historiques sur l'Inde sur general Lalli et sur plusieurs autres sujets", *Oevres Completes*, Vol.1.2 (Paris, 1827 edn.) which was cited in the survey by N. V. Nikiforov, *Vostok i usemimaya istorie* (The East in World History), Moscow, "Mysl," 1977.
217. Comment by K. Sivamakrishna in Greensborough, P. (ed), *Nature in the Global South*, (2003), p. 261. The other sources mentioned in the text are: Ludden, "Anglo-Indian Empire," in B. Stein, *The Making of Agricultural Policy in British India* (O.D.P., New Delhi, 1992); Subranamayan, S., "The Mughal State: Structure or Process?," *Indian Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 29, No.3; Habib, "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism," in *Papers and Proceedings of the Asian History Conference*, 1961, published 1969.
218. Seret; Y., "Le concept du mode de production asiatique et les interpretations.de l'histoire Ottomane," *La Pensee*, No. 186, 1976; See also Islamogu and Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History," *Review*, No.1, 1977.
219. Rodinson, M., *Islam and Capitalism*, London, New Left Books. We have not here given detail on Arabia. Much is contained in the T.E. Lawrence. The Kingdoms of Hejaz and Nejd were renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1939
220. Gallisot, R., and Badia, G., *Marxisme et Algerie: Textes de Marx et Enels*, Paris, 1976.
221. Rodinson, op.cit. Another useful source is Inalchik, H. *Otomansko Carsivo* - the English translation is

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- The Ottoman Sultans*, Belgrade, League of Communists Publishing House, 1974.
222. Grekov, B., *Kiev Rus*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.
223. *Granat* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 3rd edn., Vol.22, 1976, p.399. The issue of an AMP in Russia's history was but squarely in Wittfogel's, *Oriental Despotism* and by P. Vidal-Naquet in his article "la Rouse et le mode de production asiatique." *Les Annales*, No.2, 1966.
224. Plekhandv, G., *Selected Philosophical Works*, in Russian, Moscow, 1914; in English, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1961. Even more relevant is Plekhanov, G. *History of Russian Social Thought*. We have used the Serbian version of this book, *Istorija Ruske Drushveni Misli*, Sarajevo, Vol.1., "Veselin Maslesha," 1975. In the 1981 collection of essays on AMP edited by Bailey, A. & Llobera, J. it is recorded (p.58) that Plekhanov discussed aspects of Oriental Despotism in his review of political geographer Mechnyikovlyeve's *Civilizations and the History of the Great Rivers*, in the socialist journal, *Die Neue Zeit*, 1890, (pp. 436-48). He wondered about some countries forming AMP-type systems (as we would call them today), notably lands around the Nile river, Greece, Rome and South America. A fuller examination of Plekhanov as an historian was given by academician Pokrovsky in his article "G. V. Plekhanov kak istorist Rosii," (Plekhanov as an historian of Russia), *Pod Znamenom Marksizma*, Vol. 3, Nos. 6-7, 1923.
225. Kovolyev, S. "O nektorih problemah robovladchelckoi formacii" (On Some Problems of the Slave Formation), *Problemi istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshstva*, No.2, 1933.
226. Melekechvili, G., "Esclavage, feudalism et le mode de production asiatique" (Slavery, Feudalism and the Asiatic Mode of Production), *La Pensee*, No.132, 1967.
227. Gunther, R. "Problemes theoretiques de la societe esclavagiste" (Some Theoretical Problems of Slave Society), *Recherches Internationales*, 1957.
228. Pokora, T., "Was China a Slave Society?" *Recherches Internationales* Nos. 57-8, 1967.
229. *Granat*, Vol.22, p.399.
230. The Russian scholars were Tumenev, A., *Gosudarstvennoe drevnogo Sumera*, (State-controlled Economy of Ancient Sumeria), Moscow and Leningrad, 1956 and Yakanov, I., *Razvitak zemelnihotoshenii v Astirii*, (Development of Agrarian Economy in Assyria), Leningrad, 1949.
231. Frankfort, H., *The Birth of Civilisation in the Near East* (London, Northgate, 1951, p. 60). See also Heise, John, *Old Sumerian Age* and Oakes, John, *Babylon* (1979). A detailed essay on the state formations and the modes of production in the history of the area is Tosi, M., "The Dialectic of State Formations in Mesopotamia, Iran and Central Asia," *Dialectical Anthropology*, No.1, 1976.
232. The interesting history of Syria reveals many despots; one, Queen Zobia, seems to have ruled an empire with AMP-type characteristics.
233. Parain, C., "Proto-historie Mediterannee et mode de production asiatique" (Proto History of the Mediterranean and the Asiatic Mode of Production), *La Pense*, No. 127, 1966. A more detailed account is in the awesome book by Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Epoch of Philippe II*.
234. See "The Reforms of Urukagin," in Bailey, N.M., (ed.) *Readings in Ancient History* (Heath, 1992, p.21).
235. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology* in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., p.45ff.
236. Among the Soviet scholars who undertook research on primitive communism were those appearing in the conference proceedings published in the Danilove 1968 volume: Kolemitskaya, N.F., "On the Question of the Structures of the Earliest Societies;" Vitkin, M.A., "Problems of Periodisation of Primitive Societies;" Butinova, N.A., "Primitive Societies: Basic Stages and Localised Variants;" Krukov, M. B., "Basic Types of Primitive Societies and Their Historical Importance."
237. Scholars in the USSR who wrote on barbarism for the Danilova 1968 volume included Victorova, L.L., "Class Structure of Higher Barbarism," and Gurevich, A., "Tribe and Society in Barbarism."
238. Wells, H. G., *Outline History of the World*, had a good discussion about the relative role of material and religious factors in the rise and spread of Islam. See Vol. 1 of this book (London: Waverley Book 1925).
239. An English geographer of note who saw great relevance of geography in explaining historical change was J.I. Horrab, who in the 1930s wrote the most useful volume, *Sketch of Economic Geography*.
240. The Soviet authors who wrote on the specifics of the slave mode of production were: Turin, V. A., "On the Social Formations Slavery and Feudalism in the East," in Danilova, (ed. 1968); Volova, L.A., *Izmenie Socialno-ekonomicheskoi strukturi Kitayskoi Derevni* (Changes in the Structure of Ancient China), Moscow, "Nauka," 1972; Robishanov, Y.M., "Feudalism, Slavery and AMP;" Korostovtsev, M.A., "The

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- Specifics of Slave Society in Ancient Asia." The last two essays appeared as chapters in Kim (ed.), 1966.
241. Neuskim, A.I., "Early Feudalism as a Stage in the History of Western Europe," in Danilova, op. cit., 1968.
242. N. Ter-Akopian (ed.), op. cit., pp 270-4.
243. *Ibid*.
244. Engels, "The Frankish Period" in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., pp. 361-75.
245. Examples include Bloch, M., *Feudal Society* (English edition, 1961); George Duhy, *The Early Growth of the European Economy* (translator. H.B. Clarke); Francois-Louis Genchoff (translator: P. Grier), *Feudalism*, (Cornell University Press, 1967.)
246. Marx, extracts from *Capital* Vol. 1 and 3, in Ter-Akoian, op. cit., p. 140 and p.155.
247. Engels, letter to Marx, 22 December, 1882 in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., p.517.
248. Dobb, M.H., *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, London, Routledge, 1946.
249. Hilton, R. H., *The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1976. The same book had been earlier edited by Paul Sweezy for Monthly Review Press.
250. Fine, Ben, *Social Capital and Social Theory*, London, Routledge, 2000.
251. Marx, letter to Annenkov, in Ter-Akopian, op. cit., p.492.
252. *Granat*, Vol. 13, 1976, pp. 603-5.
253. Marx, *Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, FLPH, 1959, pp.212-13.
254. Krader, L., "Principi i Kritika ANP," *Marksizam u Svetu*, No.2, 1979.
255. *Bulletin of Radio Belgrade*, Third Program, No.1, 1981.
256. Lange, Oscar, *Essays on the Political Economy of Socialism*, Warsaw and London, Pergamon, 1969.
257. Leontiev, W.W. "Marxian Economics," quoted in Dobb, M. H., *On Economic Theory and Socialism*, London, Routledge, 1954.
258. Kachanovski, J. V., *Robovlyadenie, feodolizam ili aziatiski sposobe?* (Slavery, Feudalism or the Asiatic Mode?), Moscow, Nauka, 1971.
259. Karl Marx, extracts from *Capital*, Vol. 1., in Ter-Akopian, op.cit., pp.140-7.
260. Habib, I., "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism," Asian History Conference, India, *Papers and Proceedings*, 1969.
261. Yang Zhong, *Local Government and Politics in China*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2003.
262. *The Economist*, London, August, 2003.
263. Carl Jung made use of Rider Haggard's novel, *She* (also called *Ayesha*). The focus of the novel is that Ayesha rules over a "lost" civilization in a city somewhere in Africa. The Queen of the city is described as "very beautiful," but "terrible and fascinating." She is fluent in Arabic, Latin and Greek. In his own psycho-analytical work Jung used Ayesha as an example of *anima* in peoples' dreams. 264. Douglas, Mary, *Purity and Danger*, London, Routledge, 1976.
265. Evans, Grant, a statement quoted in the *South China Morning Post*, 6 January, 2003.
266. Hewison, K., Review of Tanabe and Keyes, "Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and Identity in Thailand and Laos," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 33., pp 550-52, 2003.
267. *Ibid*.
268. It could be argued that concern with the heart was part of the superstructure of AMP. A poem from ancient Babylon runs: "Sing joyful melodies to calm her heart; her heart is full of clemency, break not my heart with grief." In ancient Egypt, the heart was considered the centre of Spirit and Courage once the Mummy had been elevated to God. The ancient Hindus believed that the heart was the seat of emotion and intelligence – it was through the heart that Man was united with God.
269. Chan, Adrian, "Confucianism and Development in East Asia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 26, No.1, 1996.
270. This particularly nauseous example came from the pen of T. Benigno, "Parliamentary System not for Philippines," *Philippine Star*, 12 May 2003. His list of Asian virtues is mostly borrowed from "psy-war" expert, American Lucien Pye.
271. Oakley, D. A., *Brain and Mind*, London, Methuen, 1985. Oakley's discussion parallels that of the materialist school which wrote extensively on the psychology of the higher nervous system. The opposite "school" was that of the idealist speculation tendency (as seen in the book Freud and Marx by Osbourne).

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272. Bentley, Evie, *Bio-Rhythm*, London, Routledge, 1986, p. 22.
273. Buck, Pearl, "Introduction" to her edition of the classical novel of old China, *All Men are Brothers*, Vol. 1, p.xix.
274. Gunn, G., Review of "Socialisme et Le Paysan Cambodge (Socialism and the Cambodian Peasant)," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol.30, No.2, 2000.
275. For further details see Shawcross, op. cit., p. 376 ff.
276. Wade, R., "Japan, the World Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance," *New Left Review*, No. 217, May, 1966.
277. For the Indian Case of state planning and controls see Sen, Apura, *Industrialisation and Class Formation in India*, London, Routledge, 1982 and Misra, A., "Dynamics of State Formation: India and Europe Compared," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 29, No.3, p. 425 ff.
278. Gordon, Alec, Review of "Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labour," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 31, 2001, 419-20.
279. The role of *the Secret* in modern government as well as in past hierarchies was emphasised by Marx in "Critique of Hegel's Theory of the State," republished in Easton and Goddard (eds.), *Writings of the Young Marx on Politics*.
280. By contrast in the case of the USSR, the Cheka and the KGB were successors of the Tsarist secret police that sent thousands into prison and exile. The Cheka repressed right-wing insurgents at the time of the civil war; the KGB defended borders and the general position of the bureaucracy.
281. Ilychev, I., "Revolutionary Science in Our Age," *Kommunist*, Moscow, No. 11, 1964. It should be mentioned that this comment was made at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute. East European intellectuals were developing a hostile stance towards China, too. Thus the noted Yugoslav novelist, Ivo Andrich, wrote in his *Days of the Consuls*, that a number of character traits evident in Turkish officialdom smacked of "Chinese rigidity." Among these features he included obstinacy, fear of innovation, mistrust, hypocrisy, and autarchy.
282. See the review by Gunn of "Asian Values: Encounters with Political Party Systems," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 30, No.2, 2000.
283. O'Donnell, G., "Delegative Democracy," in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No.1, 1999.
284. Skene, C., "Authoritarian Practices in New Democracies," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 33, No.2, 2003.
285. Crofts, N., "East Asian Growth: Before and After the Crash," *IMF Staff Papers*, Vol. 64, No.2, 1999.
286. Kachanovski, op. cit.
287. McFarlane, Bruce, "Politics of the World Bank-IMF Nexus in Asia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol.31, No.2, 2001, gives more details about pressure on the clients of IMF and World Bank.
288. Robert Cooper is the author of a book highly sympathetic to a re-ordering of the world under Western control. British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote the Forward to the book which was called *Re-Ordering the World*.
289. Bedford, Ian, *The Teleganu Uprising*, Mimeo, University of Sydney, 1970.
290. Playford, J.D., "Totalitarian Models," *Arena* (Melbourne), 1960.

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