

Editorial	1
Culture: Leavis and Marx	Gerald Gill 3
Living off Asia	Humphrey McQueen ... 13
Cairns Reassessed: A Critique of McQueen	Gay Summy 38
The United States: Radical Underground	
Scholarship	Ron Witton 62
James McAuley: The Poetry and the	
Attitude	John Docker 73

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In Coming Arenas?

It is said that a people construct their own history to give depth, meaning and perspective to their experience of the present. In this process they do not invent 'the facts' of past events: constructing a past is more a question of significant emphasis—and of equally significant oversight, in a struggle to control the interpretation of current practice. The differences between contenders have seldom been total. Even though they may be interpreted as being so there remains a latent area of agreement: a groundwork which reaches back beyond the structure of current practice to encompass a tradition of cultural relations and meanings which may reach beneath a series of revolutionary transformations.

In conventional political theory this is not sufficiently recognized. Being predominantly concerned with the politics of structure it concentrates on the figures—the classes, the institutions, the parties and pressures of specific interests which differentiate and so define the world of social experience. Culture, the ground of social structure, escapes attention; because it is always present we can treat it as if it is not present at all. It is only when the social ground is itself undergoing transformation that it pushes itself into view. People begin to grasp that they are oppressed, or oppress others, not merely in the specific structural arrangements of work, of politics, or family life; the very ground of these specificities is seen to be hegemonically ordered; we begin to sense that the assumptions with which we begin our social life set limits to the terms of its conduct.

discussion to make it relevant to a marxist journal has been rather artificially imposed upon the original; the ensuing lack of integration has been recognized in separate conclusions addressed to the different audiences.

1. *The German Ideology* (1846): Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 37.
2. F. R. Leavis: *English Literature In Our Time And The University*, Chatto Windus, 1969, p. 57.
3. R. Williams: *Culture and Society*, Penguin, p. 16.
4. H. Marcuse: "Affirmative Character of Culture" in *Negations*, Beacon, p. 94, 95.
5. R. Williams: *ibid.*, p. 17.
6. In this context see especially Leavis's debate with C. P. Snow.
7. Leavis: *ibid.*, p. 56.
8. Leavis: *ibid.*, p. 46.
9. Marx and Engels: *The German Ideology*, *ibid.*, p. 459-466.
10. R. Hogart: "Mass Communications in Britain" in *The Pelican Guide to English Literature*, B. Ford (ed.), p. 454.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Leavis uses this term often and really means it.
13. Leavis: *ibid.*, p. 48.
14. For an excellent discussion of Leavis's critical practice see J. Casey: *The Language of Criticism*, Methuen (1966), Ch. 8.
15. R. Supak: "Polydeterminism in Cultural Criticism" in *Socialist Humanism*, E. Fromm (ed.); see also E. Kamenka: *Marxism and Ethics*, Macmillan, p. 37-38.

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN AUSTRALIA

Mike Duigan and Greg O'Leary

Introduction by Humphrey McQueen

88 pages. \$1.00 plus postage from Radical Education Project, 12 Martlesham Crescent, Daw Park, 5041, or at bookshops.

Living off Asia

HUMPHREY McQUEEN

I said in 1914, and in recent years, that this country, with its resources of man-power, cannot afford to be a policeman in Europe. I now say it in 1943 and for all the years to come that this land may remain free only by Australia remaining the policeman in the Pacific.

I believe that Curtin would have wanted a foreign and defence policy much like that of the Australian Labor Party today.
John Curtin,¹
J. F. Cairns, 1968²

From its earliest days the ALP has been proud to be the Defend Australia Party and it has always made it clear that Asia constituted the principal threat.³ Although much has changed in the last decade certain assumptions and orientations persist. These themes remain to influence the formation of Labor's foreign policy attitudes. They are less explicit than they were, although they continue to surface in the opinions of leaders like Calwell,⁴ and Fred recently reaffirmed his faith in racial homogeneity for Australia,⁵ and Fred

* In preparing this article I have taken into account the need to demonstrate my thesis because much of it will be novel; this has necessitated frequent and often lengthy quotations from leading ALP spokesmen and from official ALP publications. The controversial nature of the article also accounts for the otherwise unpardonable density of footnotes. The text of the article was completed in April and since then there have been a parliamentary debate, a Federal ALP conference, the ALP mission to China and a major speech by Barnard. None of these alter the argument presented below — indeed they confirm it. Some of this recent material has been added to the footnotes but I hope to make a detailed examination of these matters, in particular the Launceston Conference decisions, in a 'Trailer' in the next *Arena*.

Daly.⁵ However, this article is not concerned with paleolaborism but with the new men of power—the technocratic laborites⁶—Dunstan, Whitlam and Barnard. Cairns occupies a different position because, as a 'radical reformer' in the English Fabian tradition, he is outside the mainstream of Australian labor politics, and it is for this reason, as he says himself, that he is often mistaken for a socialist and even a communist.⁷ His Fabianism makes him susceptible to the social tinkering and efficiency of the technocrats, although the influence of G. D. H. Cole's Guild Socialism tends to make him less overtly elitist. This article will trace the burgeoning of the strategy of these men for counter-revolution in Asia under the following six headings:

- (a) US alliance;
- (b) Vietnam;
- (c) defence;
- (d) trade;
- (e) aid; and
- (f) parliamentarism.

Before proceeding with the substance of the article it will be necessary to give some explanation of the motivation of these leaders. It is highly likely that Whitlam is unaware of most of the implications of what he advocates and this is relatively true for the others, although Cairns is occasionally confused, Barnard honestly dull and Dunstan superficially clever. But these personal traits are contingent and interchangeable. Even if each of them is unaware of what they are up to, their entire political praxis within the ALP would inevitably lead them to the very same conclusions. The 'democratic socialism' which the ALP has practised in Australia was possible only because of the truly fateful meridian occupied by Australia within British imperialism.⁸ Nehru once criticized Menzies for pretending to understand India's problems on the

¹ Address to NSW ALP Conference, *Sydney Morning Herald* (S.M.H.), 7 June, 1943.

² Preface to Irene Dowsing, *Curran of Australia*, Blackburn, 1969, p. vi.

³ Humphrey McQueen, *A New Britannia*, Penguin Books, 1970, chs. 1, 5, 6 and 7.

⁴ *The Herald*, 8 January, 1971.

⁵ *Sunday Review*, 17 January, 1971, p. 423.

⁶ For a preliminary investigation of technocratic laborism in Australia see Kelvin Rowley's chapter in John Playford and Douglas Kirsner (eds.), *Australian Capitalism*, Penguin Books, 1971, but the best short definition was given by Harold Wilson: "In all our plans for the future, we are re-defining and re-stating our Socialism in terms of the scientific revolution."

This is what Whitlam was driving at when he said "Of course I'm considerably to the left of Mr. Calwell—I'm much more in accord ideologically with Dr. Cairns than with Mr. Calwell" (*The Age*, 8 March, 1965). Cairns returned the compliment by pointing out that many people only 'think' there is a big difference between him and Whitlam (*Lot's Wife*, 4 April, 1967).

⁷ *Australian*, 3 March, 1967.

⁸ See Bruce McFarlane's chapter in Playford and Kirsner, *op. cit.*

grounds that he also had been born in a colony—Victoria. A similar point can be made against the ALP's response to Asia which offers Asia the Australian road to capitalism without recognizing that that road closed nearly a century ago and that no new capitalist economies have emerged since Japan which had to pay a terrible price for being the hindmost.⁹ Democratic socialism is not exportable on the point of an argument nor even through the barrel of a gun. Yet it has exercised such an influence within Australia that the ALP leadership cannot but believe that it will work everywhere; they can hardly do otherwise since to doubt its universality might provoke questions about its purpose within Australia.¹⁰

Thus there is no need to look for CIA pipelines nor even to arch eyebrows at reports of secret briefings in Washington.¹¹ To do this would be to miss the point entirely. It is not a question of the US imperialists telling Whitlam *et al* to be counter-revolutionary; rather it is a question of Whitlam *et al* telling the imperialists how to be more effective at it. There is no disagreement over ends, only over means.

ALP leaders are clear and united on one thing; that *revolution* is the issue. "The question that faces us in South Vietnam," Calwell said in 1964, "... is not whether there is to be a revolution. It is whether the inevitable revolution—for revolution there must be—is to be a Communist one or not."¹² Three months later he was even more specific and claimed that Australia's task was "to aid the greatest revolutionary power of modern times—the United States of America—in directing the course of that revolution."¹³ Cairns expressed a similar view in 1966. Since "it is impossible to destroy the movement for change in South East Asia. The important thing to do is to recognize this and seek to channel it and to modify it."¹⁴ It is worth considering what this policy of direction and

⁹ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Allen Lane, London, 1967, chs. V-VI.

¹⁰ See my chapter 'Glory Without Power' in Playford and Kirsner, *op. cit.*

One of the main differences between the laborism described in 'Glory Without Power' and that of the technocrats is the shift away from unintentional consequences towards the articulation of definite policies for rescuing capitalism. The days when a Labor leader stumbled ineluctably towards capitalist solutions are being replaced by the emergence of deliberate contingency planning. J. F. Cairns, *Tariffs or Planning*, Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1971, is an excellent example of this, as are the industrial policies of R. J. Hawke and Clyde Cameron for which see Peter Shearer's forthcoming analysis in *Arena*.

¹¹ After one such discussion, L. B. Johnson described Whitlam as 'the young and brilliant leader of the Australian Labor Party' (*Age*, 16 June, 1967).

¹² *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives (C.P.D., H. of R.), 19 March, 1964, pp. 678-9; as well as the Calwellian revolution we can now choose from revolutions offered by Channel 7, President Nixon and the manufacturers of several detergents.

¹³ Address to 1964 NSW ALP Conference, *The Challenge Before Us*, Canberra, 1964, p. 12.

A source quote from Summary p. 48

modification would have meant in the past: what would Cairns have done to the Levellers in England; the *sans-culottes* in France; the Bolsheviks in Russia; the communists in China? What he wants is not revolution at all but simply major adjustments to the existing system.

Cairns has made this explicit. In his pamphlet, *Economics and Foreign Policy*, he asks:

What are the possibilities of avoiding deterioration of these conditions into "disorder" and into "national revolutionary wars"? This is the essential question about which this pamphlet is written.

To answer this question we need to examine what modern capitalism is able to do and we need to examine what can be done in the colonial and under-developed countries themselves.¹⁶

Speaking in Parliament in 1966 he posed the alternatives for Asia thus: "Will they do it on the Communist pattern, which will come if the Communists are left to win the allegiance of the new nationalists, or will it be done in a kind of democratic socialist pattern in alliance with the democratic capitalist world?"¹⁸ There is no doubt which he preferred. *Economics and Foreign Policy* contains a most relevant discussion of the Cuban revolution. Cairns quotes profusely from Theodore Draper's *Castroism: Theory and Practice* on how to overthrow Castro. Cairns makes only one criticism of Draper's anti-Cuban Strategy: "In Cuba it is now too late for Draper's advice to be of any use."¹⁷ But it is not too late everywhere: if a government nationalizes a foreign company, "security demands that the upheaval should be cordoned off. This can be achieved not by sending in European or stooge troops but by establishing an effective perimeter around the country or area through which 'armed expeditions' cannot penetrate."¹⁸ Thus the ALP's recognition of its counter-revolutionary purpose is clear enough: it remains to detail the tactics they hope to employ.

A. The US Alliance

I would hope that Americans would take as much interest in Australia and in South-East Asia as they do in Latin America.
E. G. Whitlam, 1970¹⁹

The sentiments expressed by Curtin in December, 1941, have dimmed somewhat today. No longer is it possible to expect massive

¹⁴ C.P.D., H. of R., 30 August, 1966, p. 548. Opinion amongst ALP backwoodsmen is no less severe. M. D. Cross told the House that "We do not stand for mob rule; we stand for law and order. We believe in law and order in Indo-China and throughout the world" (*Ibid.*, 25 August, 1970, p. 448).

¹⁵ J. F. Cairns, *Economics and Foreign Policy*, Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1966, p. 11.

¹⁶ C.P.D., H. of R., 11 October, 1966, p. 1562.

¹⁷ *Economics and Foreign Policy*, p. 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

US military intervention on our behalf in the same direct and obvious manner sought and obtained during the war with Japan. But the alliance remains of 'crucial importance'²⁰ for the ALP's Asian strategy.

Whitlam's endorsement of the Alliance is total and he considers his "greatest obligation . . . on the party platform in foreign affairs is to preserve the US alliance, to make it enduring and fruitful".²¹ From this it is apparent that he is unsatisfied with its present form and his 1967 Senate policy speech criticized the government for staking "everything on a short term military involvement likely to lead in the long term to disillusion and total withdrawal."²² In the first Ewart Memorial Lecture, Whitlam outlined the general field in which he intended to develop the American Alliance: "More than any other country in the area," he said, "Australia is able and bound to interpret the United States to the countries of the region and to interpret those countries to the United States," since "our size and proximity enable us to do things which our allies cannot."²³ Two years later in 1968 he told the NSW ALP Conference that "the whole attitude of the Labor Party towards Australia's allies is not just to walk out but to speak up."²⁴ Whitlam has made it clear that as Foreign Minister in his own government he intends to play an active diplomatic role on behalf of the US; he will be for America what Menzies tried to be for Britain. But this diplomatic agency is only one span of the bridge he hopes to build — armed force, trade and aid are not to be neglected.

Cairns has always been impressed by American liberals, that is, by the people who conceived the Vietnam and Cuban affairs of the early sixties. He began *Living With Asia* by affirming "that the most humane and advanced thinking anywhere in the world about international relations and economic organization relevant to Australia's needs is to be found in the United States."²⁵ He has consistently aligned himself with the Vietnam stance of the Kennedys and the Fullbrights.²⁶ On his return from the US in 1967 he declared it to be free of McCarthyism and the freest

¹⁹ Address to American-Australian Association, New York, 14 July, 1970, p. 8. Addressing an Australian-American Association luncheon in June 1964, the then Labor Premier of NSW, J. B. Renshaw, referred to Australians and Americans as both being "in the constant menace of external aggression" and emphasized the need "to maintain and increase our importance as a bastion of Western civilization in the Pacific area" (*Australian-American Journal* (Sydney), 1965 edition, p. 46).

²⁰ ALP Federal Platform, Adelaide, 1969, p. 30.

²¹ *Australian*, 22 November, 1967, cited in H. S. Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1970, p. 49.

²² *Policy Speech* (Canberra), pp. 9-10; C.P.D., H. of R., 26 March, 1968, p. 459.

²³ E. G. Whitlam, *Australia — Base or Bridge?*, Sydney, 1966, p. 5.

²⁴ *Speech*, 8 June, 1968, p. 6.

²⁵ J. F. Cairns, *Living With Asia*, Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1965, p. 3.

²⁶ C.P.D., H. of R., 11 October, 1966, p. 1562.

country he had ever visited.²⁷ In the heat of the 1966 election campaign Cairns approvingly quoted the Asian strategy of Roger Hilsman, who had been US Under-Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961-4. Hilsman had advocated firmness, flexibility and dispensation:

By firmness we mean firmness in our determination to maintain our strength in Asia. That is, American strength—to stand by our commitments to our allies, including our friends on Taiwan; and to deter and meet Chinese Communist aggression. By flexibility, we mean a willingness to negotiate, to talk, to maintain, in the words of the speech, an “open door” to a lessening of hostility. And by dispensation²⁸ we mean a capacity to look at China policy coolly, with the interests of our nation and of humanity in mind and without the blinding emotion that has clouded our analysis of the problem of dealing with China in the past.²⁹

More recently, Cairns has located a new American ally—the Chairman of the Bank of America, Louis B. Lundborg, whose testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been part of almost every speech Cairns has made since August 1970. Lundborg objects to the war because it “distorts the American economy” and “is a major contributor to inflation”.³⁰ The distortion occurs because the old technology has been neglected for electronics. Lundborg’s complaint is that the traditional beneficiaries of war—iron and steel, food, clothing—are being badly done by. From this Cairns concludes that “the prospects of change from the old militaristic and repressive policy in the United States is sufficiently good to justify a constructive attitude towards it.”³¹ Cairns is offering a policy of better the warmonger we used to know than the one we know now.

This is Cairns’ second foray into analysing US imperialism, his first being his pamphlet *Economics and Foreign Policy*. Since he is the only leading ALP spokesman to acknowledge the existence of US imperialism his ideas deserve further consideration. Throughout his examination of imperialism Cairns brilliantly confirms Joan

Robinson’s proposition that the dominant characteristic of contemporary bourgeois thought is its confusion. He begins by dividing the world up into rich nations, such as North America, with an average income of £900 p.a., and poor nations, such as in Asia with an average income of £40 p.a.³² This is not so much wrong as irrelevant. He simply asked the wrong questions. The point to note is not that the average American is better off than the average Asian but that a small group of Asians are as rich, if not richer than a small group of Americans. From the recognition that the rich are everywhere it might have been possible to approach a class analysis. But that would have led to Marx, whom Cairns considers “inadequate” as a social thinker. Having avoided the central point about imperialism in this way, it is inevitable that Cairns should spend the rest of his time in gyrating in ever-widening circles around the importance of ‘economic’ considerations in imperialism. He finally decides that America believes she “is not in Vietnam merely for economic reasons. She is there to present her total or essential national personality. She is there on a civilizing mission—to save the Vietnamese from Communism.”³³

However he has already demonstrated the precise economic need which fed America’s intervention in Vietnam when he pointed out that “The United States does not seek to exercise tied privileges in particular areas of the world, but to obtain free access for investment and trade to all areas . . . The ‘advance of communism’, of course, removes countries from America’s field of trade and investment . . .”³⁴ Cairns’ contradictions do not prove that imperialism is purely economic; nor can anything prove such an absurd proposition. What they show are the extra-ordinary lengths to which Cairns goes to present US imperialism in the most sympathetic light possible.³⁵

In his prepared speech to the February 1971 Anti-War conference in Sydney, Cairns returned to his analysis of US imperialism to which he attached a good deal of moral approbrium

³² *Economics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 3-4. For further details on Lundborg’s activities, see Michael Sweeney, ‘From Dustbowl to Saigon’, *Ramparts*, November, 1970, p. 45.

³³ *Economics and Foreign Policy*, p. 16. Cairns indulges in ritualistic anti-communism. He has described communism as ‘callously expedient and dogmatic’ (*Non-Violent Power*, October, 1970, p. 7), which is an interesting though impossible combination. In *The Eagle and the Lotus*, China makes a guest appearance as ‘the robot’ (p. 227). Someone should tell Cairns about Richard Cobb and the revolutionary personality. Although Cairns offers none of his precious ‘facts’ in evidence, he writes that he has ‘no doubt that there was as much vicious and unnecessary killing by the Hanoi and NLF forces as is claimed’ (p. 225). He does not even bother to say which claim he finds indubitable.

³⁴ *Economics and Foreign Policy*, p. 13.

³⁵ Senator John Wheelon (WA) has managed to do a little public relations work for Salazar. On Wheelon’s return from Portuguese Timor he approvingly quoted an unnamed French anthropologist to the effect that ‘the Portuguese were the most benign colonialists’. He also repeated the line that Portugal is a polycontinental nation (*Pacific*, January-February, 1967, pp. 5-6).

²⁷ For a dissection of this proposition see Janet Surrow, ‘Fairy Freedom and Flower Power’, *Lot’s Wife*, 25 July 1967, p. 5.

²⁸ The point about ‘dispensation’ would have particular appeal to Cairns’ extreme positivism. That this positivism is the hallmark of ALP thinking is clear from this statement of Clyde Cameron’s: ‘The honourable member for Yarra said, amid great applause in the caucus room yesterday, that he believed that if only people with divergent viewpoints could agree on what were the facts we would have little difficulty in arriving at solutions or conclusions.’ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 25 March, 1965, p. 378; cf. J. F. Cairns, ‘Some Problems in the Use of Theory in History’, *Economic Record*, vol. 26, December, 1950.

²⁹ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 11 October, 1966, p. 1561.

³⁰ *Non-Violent Power*, October, 1970, p. 8; *Herald*, 31 August, 1970, cf. *Ramparts*, December, 1970, p. 36.

³¹ *Non-Violent Power*, October, 1970, p. 8.

and compared "The crimes of American leadership in Vietnam . . . with the crimes of Hitler". Yet he is as far as ever from a class analysis when he speaks of every citizen being guilty of the crimes of his leaders; moreover, he refrained from using the word imperialism but coined the nebulous formula 'military-industrial-religious complex'. In terms of an analysis of imperialism, he has clearly not proceeded beyond the confusion of his 1966 pamphlet.

B. Vietnam

I think the next American President is going to be pretty close to my views, whoever he is, even Nixon.
J. R. Cairns³⁶

Vietnam has proved a testing ground for more than weapons. Like a barricade it not only keeps people out; it enables one to see who is on the other side. Cairns, Whitlam, Calwell and Barnard have all made it clear that they want us (i.e. US) to win. Cairns has been quite explicit on this. Speaking in August 1966 he declared: "I want to place emphasis on one point above all: It is for defence, above all, that prevailing policy should be changed . . ." This policy, after twenty years of failure must be changed.³⁷ Or as Barnard put it: "Since 1965 the Australian Labor Party has repeatedly and consistently pointed out that a war of this nature . . . could not be won in the conventional military sense. We gave this warning in the first year of the war and we have repeated it every year since."³⁸

To demystify the history of opposition to the war by ALP leaders it will be useful to trace the evolution of their attitudes.

In March 1964 Calwell told the parliament that "military support is necessary in the present situation." He had two major criticisms of the government's decision to send advisors. Firstly, a military solution alone would not work; secondly, the Government had allowed Australia's defences to run down to such an extent that it could not send more.³⁹ At the NSW ALP Conference three months later he re-endorsed military action but feared that "there is a very real danger that the longer this war continues, the weaker will the American and the Western position become." His complaint against the government was "not to what they have done, but to the mindlessness behind it all".⁴⁰ After the first bombing raids in August 1964 he continued to support military effort since negotiations must proceed from strength. However, the situation was deteriorating and a political solution was urgent while it would still be possible to salvage something.⁴¹

In February 1965 the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party Executive adopted a resolution which endorsed continued military

action and found the bombing of the North to be 'unexceptional'. This resolution was endorsed by the caucus five weeks later.⁴² It was praised by Menzies as "remarkable and worthy of applause". Whitlam took great comfort from this.⁴³ In May 1965 Calwell made another major speech on Vietnam which praised Diem's early years in power and called for new methods in the fight against communism and China, before proceeding to oppose completely the sending of 800 troops.⁴⁴ By the 1966 elections he was committed to the recall of conscripts immediately but regulars would be withdrawn "at the earliest practicable moment after consultation with our Allies and so as not to endanger the lives of any Australian or allied troops."⁴⁵

Whitlam continually opposed withdrawal of regulars throughout 1966.⁴⁶ He maintained this policy throughout 1967⁴⁷ and won endorsement for a version of it at the 1967 Federal Conference. At the Senate election that year he promised to use Australia's commitment as a lever to influence the Americans. Only as the very last and very, very remote resort did he envisage withdrawal.⁴⁸ Even the Tet Offensive did not shake him immediately as he told the *Canberra Times* on 19 February, 1968 that he was still opposed to withdrawal.⁴⁹ Since the defeat of Johnson, Whitlam has advocated withdrawal of all Australian troops within six months.⁵⁰ Today even McMahon has been forced to withdraw.

C. Defence

. . . I refer honourable members to the defence programme which appears on page 6 of the Defence Report 1970. It is very much like the defence programme of the ALP which can be found in our Federal platform almost with the same phraseology.
Gordon Bryant⁵¹

In the wake of the imperialist debacle in Vietnam the ALP has been forced to think seriously about defence, just as Santamaria

⁴² Cited in E. G. Whitlam, *Beyond Vietnam*, Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1968, pp. 15-16.

⁴³ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 19 August, 1965, p. 291.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 4 May, 1965, p. 1105.

⁴⁵ 1966 Policy Speech, p. 2. On 23 February, 1966, Calwell had been asked on television in Ballarat what the ALP would do immediately if he came to office, to which he replied 'I couldn't tell you at the moment what we would do unless I knew all the factors that were operating at the time. We want the withdrawal of all troops after a peaceful settlement. We do not believe in a unilateral withdrawal of troops either by the Americans, by ourselves or by the North Vietnamese or by anybody else.'

⁴⁶ Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 80.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82; *Let Us Begin Now*, Canberra, 1967, pp. 8-9; *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 28 February, 1967, pp. 205-8. On his return from a visit to Vietnam, Barnard ran a straight 'Invasion from the North' line, *S.M.H.*, 27 May, 2 and 8 June, 1967.

⁴⁸ Senate Policy Speech, p. 7; see also ALP advertisement, *S.M.H.*, 24 November, 1967.

⁴⁹ Cited in Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 96.

⁵⁰ 1969 Policy Speech, p. 25.

⁵¹ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 19 October, 1970, p. 2422.

has. But the ALP's new defence outlook first appeared in 1963 when it adopted a policy designed to ensure Australia's "territorial security, the security of her overseas trade and her development as an independent but co-operative nation." At the same time policy was reversed to permit the stationing of troops overseas, subject to treaty arrangements being secured.⁵² This was designed to counter Indonesian activity. And as Calwell told the 1964 NSW ALP Conference, "At the last election, we put forward a defence programme which would have meant a considerably increased expenditure."⁵³ He repeated this in his 1964 Senate Policy declaring that "If it is found necessary to call upon the people of Australia for additional sacrifices, for the defence of Australia and to fulfil our part against Communism and aggression, we will not hesitate to ask for those sacrifices."⁵⁴ He had begun by charging the government with failure to "play an effective part in countering the malignant activities of international communism."⁵⁵

As the ALP's shadow defence minister Barnard is the obvious person upon whom to centre this section of the paper so we will concentrate on his 1969 Fabian Society pamphlet *Australia's Defence*. He commences by listing all the traditional socialist objections to defence (p. 3) and then proceeds as if they did not exist. Indeed he argues that "Overseas experience has shown that defence studies are an area where the traditional Fabian approach is extremely effective and rewarding" (p. 3). It is more than family nostalgia that directs his attention to the 1947 defence plans of J. J. Dedman⁵⁶ Minister in the Chifley government; he is particularly impressed by what he calls Dedman's 'total' approach to defence (pp. 6-8) which "was remarkable for its intuitive emphasis on the importance of stimulating R. and D." (Research and Development)⁵⁷ (p. 36). The full significance of this 'total' approach will be discussed presently.

⁵² ALP Special Conference, *Report*, 1963, pp. 12-13; ALP Federal Conference, *Report*, 1963, pp. 23-4.

⁵³ *The Challenge Before Us*, p. 15. Whitlam told the 1964 ALPS school that "There were no significant differences between Dr. Milliar's proposals and those made by Mr. Calwell, on the advice of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party's Defence Committee, in the last Estimates debate and at the last elections" (John Wilkes (ed.), *Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1964, p. 154).

⁵⁴ Senate Policy Speech, 1964, p. 8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4; C.P.D., H. of R., 23 March, 1965, p. 242.

⁵⁶ Barnard's heroes are J. J. Dedman, T. B. Milliar, Robert McNamara and Alastair Buchan.

⁵⁷ Barnard is full of jargon: 'requirements-pull', 'technology-push' and 'mix' burst from him like so many bullets from a machine gun. Since it is unlikely that Barnard was capable of thinking these things up for himself they are almost certainly the product of his Press Secretary, Clem Lloyd. Of course, Barnard reads and approves of them and is responsible for his choice of a man with Lloyd's political views. Barnard's intellectual plasticity makes him the more dangerous because as Minister for Defence he would be an easier mark for Pentagon pushers.

Some idea of the changes Barnard would bring to Australia's armed services can be gauged from this criticism of their present inadequacies:

[The Navy] lacks the teeth that would give it effective offensive capability.

Its offensive capacity is limited to the Oberon class submarines and the guns of the guided missile destroyers . . . The Army is in a much better shape for offensive action, but it lacks many supporting weapons and the mobile equipment which would enable it to undertake independent operations . . .

. . . the Air Force is not equipped to provide the support required in a limited war or counter-insurgency operation. The total picture that emerges is of an extremely ill-balanced and unco-ordinated structure of defence services lacking the flexibility and mobility of deployment that will be needed in the 1970's and 1980's (pp. 14-15).

More positively he points out that the ALP "would not oppose the stationing of specialist military units in Malaysia and Singapore if requested by those Governments. It would even be acceptable to station elements of the Navy and Air Force in Malaysia and Singapore with emphasis on training and equipping of indigenous forces" (pp. 12-13). This emphasis is necessary because "The basic contention of the Labor Party is that Australia's strategic frontiers are its natural boundaries" (p. 13). This leads to a clash with the LCP Government over "where these troops should be stationed and in what circumstances they should be used. The Labor Party believes that flexible and highly mobile forces should be built up and concentrated in Australia if they are to have maximum effectiveness."⁵⁸ The disagreement is purely tactical; the objective is the same. Perhaps the most revealing thing about Barnard's pamphlet is that, like his parliamentary speeches, there is not even lip-service to peace research.⁵⁹

Cairns is in fundamental agreement with Barnard's overall concept. "Speaking for myself", he told the parliament in 1964, "I would fully support the maintenance by America of a sea and air curtain around South East Asia and Asia."⁶⁰ Beyond and underneath this curtain, "Something can be done on the ground." "What must be done on the ground is to determine to prevent the transition of a bad economic and political situation into disorder."⁶² This led him to attack the TFX (F111) as useless, since it could

⁵⁸ C.P.D., H. of R., 12 March, 1970, p. 407.

⁵⁹ See Max Teichmann, 'Strategic Studies or Peace Research', *Arena*, No. 12.

⁶⁰ C.P.D., H. of R., 13 August, 1964, p. 235.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 13 August, 1964, p. 236.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 13 August, 1964, p. 237.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 20 August, 1964, p. 496.

do nothing against insurgency wars.⁶³ What he wants can be seen from the following:

Finally, with regard to these national wars, I think there has to be some containment in both respects. I think the general policy of containment is a sound policy, but the question is: Where? I think here is where serious mistakes have been made. I do not think proper consideration has been given to where is the best strategic point to make this containment. I think as far as the Pacific is concerned it is clear that it is somewhere along the 5,500 mile line from Kamchaka, north of Japan, to say Darwin in the south and then to the east and the west. This is, I believe the first line of defence in this policy of containment. Its features are that it is essentially an air and sea line of defence. It is not a land defence like South Vietnam . . . I think continental defence of Australia is a second line of defence, but necessary anyhow. Here again I think we need to think in terms of fast and manoeuvrable equipment, primarily air and sea weapons, and secondly land weapons.⁶⁴

In *Living With Asia* he expressed the principle underlying his defence thinking:

If we are to live well with Asia, we need more than an understanding of Asia; we need more than determination to be friends and a determination to solve our problems peacefully. If we are to achieve these things, we need to *feel* strong and we need to *be* strong. We need to be strong economically, and we need to be able to defend ourselves.⁶⁵

In August, 1966, he reiterated his earlier demands but was becoming increasingly concerned with building up a strike-force for the defence of Australia.⁶⁶ By his second book, he had come out in favour of a "fortress Australia" which he says is "hinted at even by the defenders of the old order" and "will, soon become the faith of Australian realists". The mantle of defence will fall from the shoulders of the old guard because "they do not know the facts" and "because they have lost confidence that they can act like realists".⁶⁷ So the new breed of technocratic laborites will inherit the earth—for they have 'facts' and confidence with a vengeance.

On the question of the continued existence of conscription there are considerable reasons for doubting that a Labor Govern-

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 21 October, 1964, p. 2166. ALP policy has had a belated and hollow recognition in Nixon's announced Asian strategy. On a visit to the US Barnard told Sam Lipiski that the defence and foreign officials of the Nixon administration had given him a much better hearing and reception than those of the Johnson administration (*Australian*, 3 December, 1970).

⁶⁵ *Living With Asia*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 30 August, 1966, p. 550.

⁶⁷ *The Eagle and the Lotus*, pp. 232-7.

ment in 1972 would abolish it entirely. The types of armed forces that the ALP wants will certainly demand the existence of a highly professional group: short term enlistments cannot give maximum efficiency. In May, 1969, Whitlam said he "would raise or augment that Army on a National Service basis only after all means of doing so on a voluntary basis had failed." ⁶⁸ As well as raising this possibility for the future Whitlam's statement clearly involves the maintenance of a 'national service' intake until the forces can be built up by new volunteers. In accord with their 'nationality principle' the ALP leaders would certainly avoid the dysfunctions involved in the present conscientious objection provisions of the Act. But beyond that nothing is certain. Barnard, who was a Captain in the Australian Cadet Corps while a school teacher, recently insisted that "The numbers in this corps should not be allowed to diminish; indeed, they should be encouraged." ⁶⁹

Official ALP policy says that "In procuring and servicing defence supplies and equipment, the Australian government should as far as practicable promote Australian aircraft, ship-building, electronics and communications industries." ⁷⁰ This has been developed by Cairns, Crean, Whitlam and Barnard into a plan for inserting an armaments and supply sector into the Australian economy. This is not to suggest that Australian capitalism has caught up with the US to the extent of possessing a permanent arms economy. It is rather that for largely balance-of-payments reasons, the ALP will provide the Australian economy with this sector which will be an innovating model for technocratic growth and a lobby for increased defence allocations; by contributing to the ALP's electoral fund such a lobby's bargaining power would be greatly increased. *It is important to realize that in order to adopt these policies the ALP abandoned its long-time opposition to the private manufacture of armaments.*

In 1964 Cairns told the House of Representatives that "At this stage in our history, defence in Australia is a matter of the strength of the nation as a whole—economically, industrially, and scientifically. To step up quickly this kind of defence means that some fundamental and unpleasant things must be done. It is here that economic policy comes in. It is here that the Budget comes in." ⁷¹ Two years later he repeated the point in the estimates debate.⁷² In 1969 he carried this policy to its logical

⁶⁸ Speech in support of Major Peter Young, 16 May, 1969.

⁶⁹ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 13 October, 1970, pp. 2007ff; 18 March, 1971, p. 1098. For a more recent confirmation of Barnard's willingness to prolong conscription see *Action*, 12 June, 1971, p. 8.

⁷⁰ ALP Federal Platform, 1969, p. 29. This was further streamlined at Launceston. In his address to the United Services Institution of NSW, 29 June 1971, Barnard said that his main regret is that I was not able to look at the new policies on defence procurement and production adopted in Launceston. (p. 42).

⁷¹ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 20 August, 1964, p. 497.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 30 August, 1966, p. 550; cf. *Living With Asia*, pp. 102-3.

conclusion by calling for a "top-level National Council to direct research into the types of aircraft, seacraft and land vehicles needed for Australian defence and to bring about co-ordination of government and industries necessary to produce them in Australia."⁷³ This call for neo-capitalism has been extended to the entire economy, and in his report on Tariffs Cairns envisaged "close co-operation between industrial management,"⁷⁴ Labor's shadow treasurer, Frank Crean, told a 'Labor Hour' radio audience in Melbourne that the government should "equale the capacity of Australian industry with the needs of Australian defence."⁷⁵

Whitlam devoted his 1965 and 1966 defence estimates speeches to pleas for defence contracts for the Australian electronics and aeronautical industries. He concluded his 1966 speech with a call "to see that Australia as a whole, and Australian industries in particular, benefit from the vast infusion of defence expenditure."⁷⁶ This became an important theme in his 1969 Policy speech in which he claimed

The Liberals can no longer be trusted on defence. They should no longer be entrusted with the defence of Australia. Look at their recent record. This is the party which has cut defence expenditure by 5%—the first peacetime cut since the end of the war in Korea.⁷⁷

The defence industries were to be given added stimulus by "arrangements with New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia for the 'standardisation' of defence equipment, for the shared production of such equipment as is within our collective technological capacity."⁷⁸ This was but part of his plan for neo-colonialist involvement in the 'region'. One of Whitlam's most illustrious doubles, Bill Morrison, MHR, told an audience of university students early in 1971 that the government had allowed the US to provide defence equipment which should have been locally procured. Australia, he concluded, should be as business-like as the Americans.⁷⁹

As shadow minister for defence it has been Barnard's responsibility to develop the notion of a permanently armed, neo-

⁷³ J. F. Cairns, 'Foreign Policy After Vietnam', in *The Asian Revolution and Australia*, AICD, Sydney, 1969, pp. 184-5.

⁷⁴ *Good Government*, April, 1970, p. 12. For an analysis of neo-capitalism, see John Playford, *Neo-Capitalism in Australia*, Arena Publications, Melbourne, 1969; and Mike Duigan and Greg O'Leary *The Military-Industrial Complex in Australia*, Adelaide, 1971.

⁷⁵ *Australian*, 10 March, 1969.

⁷⁶ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 28 October, 1965, pp. 2371-3; 13 October, 1966, pp. 1717-19; his proposals were warmly supported by Mr. Jess.

⁷⁷ 1969 Policy Speech, p. 25.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27. Barnard now wishes to include Japan in this defence standardisation (*Herald*, 29 January, 1971).

⁷⁹ *Australian*, 27 February, 1971.

capitalist economy in greatest detail.⁸⁰ Australia needs a permanent arms sector for balance of trade reasons since a 'reverse multiplier effect' operates when purchases are made overseas (pp. 21-2). He laments the fact that

Australia has fared poorly in the effort to obtain procurement contracts from America's commitments in Asia. American procurement in Australia has been a mere fraction of its immense procurement in Japan, Taiwan and other Asian countries. Defence writer, Peter Robinson, pointed out in the *Financial Review* of February 19th, 1968, the ineffectuality of Australian manufacturers in meeting Japanese and other Asian competition for off-shore procurement contracts arising from the Vietnam war: "The United State (sic) continues to see Australia in its World War II role as a supplier of food and recreation for its troops—but not as an industrial logistics base which could be of key importance in Asian operations" (pp. 29-30).

He expresses displeasure that "Australian industry under the MALLARD communications project" received only \$1.5m in contracts (pp. 39-40). The military-industrial complex must be extended beyond simple contracts since "There are also many areas where scientific and engineering skills can be transferred between the services and the civilian area, for example between the RAAF and the commercial airlines" (p. 42). His final appeal is that "Maximum efforts be devoted to broadening the base of defence industry in Australia and assuring a greater share of defence procurement to Australian industry" (p. 53).

Placing defence contracts within Australia will not merely diminish our import bill but will "make a much more important contribution to the efficient development of manufacturing both for the domestic market and for export" (p. 34). For example,

Regeneration of the domestic aircraft industry would also make possible sales to countries such as New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. If Australian aircraft in the medium price range are not available, the se countries will either turn to Japan or buy secondhand from the United States and Britain. Singapore and Malaysia have already turned to Japan for procurement of rifles. Singapore has turned to Britain for secondhand aircraft. These are areas where swift action is needed to assure a role for Australia in future procurement (p. 32).

There is yet another area of national life that is to be absorbed into the arms sector. More resources are to be "devoted to

⁸⁰ All the quotes in this section are from Barnard's pamphlet *Australia's Defence*. Page references will be included in the text. For a recent reaffirmation of these ideas see Barnard's article, 'Guns—and Bread and Butter', *Australian Financial Review*, 17 November, 1970.

generation of defence science research and development at Governmental, industrial and education levels" (p. 53). To achieve this "universities and other centres of technological research will have to be fostered by grants-in-aid" (p. 39). Universities can also be engaged "on a contract basis" to do systems analysis for defence planners (p. 26). Some indication of the nature of the work the universities would be expected to undertake is given in Barnard's account of Project AGILE:

Project AGILE which is a basic R. & D. study of special problems of limited warfare in South East Asia seems to be admirably suited to Australian R. & D. efforts. It involves elements of research such as climate, soil, hydrology, vegetation, anthropology,⁸¹ and sociology which could have been performed more effectively in Australia than in the United States. The project also involves development of appropriate hardware for counter-insurgency warfare in South East Asia. It should have been possible to assure an Australian participation from which local research and industrial facilities would have derived direct benefits (p. 39).

The *New York Times* of 20 March, 1967, described Project AGILE as "the Pentagon's worldwide counter-insurgency program." Barnard is full of praise for the "devoted work of a handful of academics who have cultivated the barren vine of defence studies over many years with no encouragement⁸² from the Government." (p. 46). He is, of course, referring to his friend, Dr. T. B. Millar, and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, which no doubt can anticipate more than encouragement from Barnard as Defence Minister in a Labor Government. His "ultimate aim" is "to achieve a mix between these three elements of defence science" (in-service, industry and education), but "giving industry and educational institutions a larger share" (p. 40).

D. Trade

I think there are advantages for American investors to have Australia as a factory in the 18th century sense of an off-shore factory for South-East Asia.
E. G. Whitlam, 1970.⁸³

To appreciate the ALP's intentions with regard to neo-colonialist trade and aid it is essential to see these in the wider context of their plan to establish a neo-capitalist economy in Australia. While they do not use these terms there is no doubt as to what they have

⁸¹ See Eric R. Wolf and Joseph G. Jorgensen, 'Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand', *New York Review of Books*, 19 November, 1970; also 'The Pentagon's Great Leap Forward', *Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram*, Vol. 1, No. 4.

⁸² The Ford Foundation has more than made up for this. See John Playford, 'Civilian Militants', *Australian Left Review*, December, 1968.

⁸³ Address to American-Australian Association, p. 7.

in mind. Whitlam has long advocated an "incomes policy" for Australia.⁸⁴ In his 1970 Senate Policy speech he warned that "the days of the 'lucky country' are running out. It is common ground among all parties that the reconstruction of rural industries and a thorough-going review of tariff policies are matters which press urgently upon us. We evade them at our peril."⁸⁵ Whitlam agrees with Cairns 'that a solution to these problems requires a plan of action by the national government, Australian manufacturers and the trade union movement. But if this is to be achieved it will need some quite basic changes of attitude both by manufacturers and the unions and it will need a national government in which both have confidence.'⁸⁶

The first step towards re-establishing the prosperity of Australian capitalism is concerned with domestic issues. Yet these will not be sufficient. What is needed is a new trading pattern, a pattern which alters our client relationship with the US and which simultaneously expands our trade with Asia.⁸⁷ These are not separate tactics but joint aspects of one policy. Whitlam was most anxious to assure American investors that:

Investment in Australia can be effective indeed . . . if that investment is primarily directed not merely to catering for the extension of the American market represented by twelve and a half million affluent Australians but as the stepping-off point, the launching pad, for the development of the hundreds of millions of people who form that arc around Australia.⁸⁸

As a model industry Whitlam offered GMH which "now earns in sales overseas just as much as it ever remits in profits to the United States".⁸⁹ He is offering to go into partnership with the Americans

⁸⁴ Address to Melbourne Trades Hall Council Dinner, 9 March, 1968. For the details of the ALP's anti-union plans, see Clyde Cameron, *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 30 September, 1970, pp. 1923-6; also report of a speech by Dunstan, *Australian*, 12 October, 1970.

⁸⁵ *Canberra Times*, 29 October, 1970.

⁸⁶ Cairns, *Good Government*, April, 1970, p. 10. Compare this with his account of Australia's industrial take-off around 1900: 'Manufacturers and workers came together in support of the Deakin Liberals and established protective tariffs without which far less industrial development would have taken place' (*Economics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 14-15). Dunstan is more ambitious in his aim and wants the ALP to force Australia into the league of the USA and Japan, *Sunday Review*, 6 December, 1970, p. 256. His outspoken opposition to White Australia is not simply the reflection of his moral beliefs; it is spurred on by the recognition that in order to sell South Australia's cars and electrical goods there must be a favourable climate of Asian opinion towards Australia generally. See his Policy Speech, 12 February, 1968, p. 14, for the economics of anti-racism; also his speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia, *Commerce*, November-December, 1970, pp. 12-15. See John Lorie's article on Dunstan in *Arena*, No. 25.

⁸⁷ Neil McInnes, 'The Challenge to Australia of the Multi-National Corporation', in G. G. Masteyman (ed.), *Big Business in Australia*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1970.

⁸⁸ Address to American-Australian Association, p. 8.

since "there are some matters in the region of Australia, the South Seas, South-East Asia, where Australia's experience, Australia's size can be a very great advantage to the United States".⁹⁰

This process he calls 'internationalisation' and parades it with the rhetoric of socialist internationalism.⁹¹ An Australian Government would "also provide incentives to promote Australian investment in the economies of Asia . . . Unless such opportunities are grasped at the outset, they may be lost forever".⁹² Two examples of this are Indonesia and the TPNNG. In Indonesia there is scope for "spark-plug investment" by the Australian government; this would yield "quick and large returns". Not everything can be left to the government: "Australian companies also have obligations. These obligations may in fact be long term opportunities. Those companies which 'get in on the ground floor' will stand to benefit as the economy expands."⁹³ This attitude to TPNNG is fully revealed by the following:

Many Australians speak as if Australian experts and capital will have no future in New Guinea when it is independent . . . Such persons forget that there are more Britons in India now than ever before and that British capital is welcomed in partnership in most important industries . . .

. . . The fair and prudent course is for private investors to join in partnership with the Australian government to develop and service New Guinea's resources . . . The Australian government has committed an act of gross folly in granting a 99-year lease to W. R. Carpenter and Co. to develop tea plantations at Mt. Hagen. The proper course would have been for the government to employ Carpenter's as its agent in setting up the tea factories and plantations or to have entered into a partnership in doing so.⁹⁴

Defence ordering offers yet another avenue for profitable trade. Australia must stop importing everything and start exporting secondhand planes to Singapore and a strike version of the Macchi to New Zealand.⁹⁵ Trade depends on stability and here it will be possible to join forces with Japan which shares Australian capitalism's interest in "the preservation of the freedom of the high seas".⁹⁶ So defence is not merely part of the new trading pattern, it is its pre-condition. Stability does not involve stagnation and it will be necessary to promote industrialisation and economic reform

since the resultant increase in trade will, according to Cairns, be 'good for the American economy'.⁹⁷

The combination of stability and progress for which the ALP is anxious can be seen in Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore. Lee is the pin-up boy of Labor's technocrats. Dunstan described him as "a great political leader" and a "social democrat".⁹⁸ Whitlam sees Singapore as the other pivot of his new trading policy—as a forward post.⁹⁹ Cairns is content that innovating governments in Asia "will be autocratic and charismatic" and will use either "physical compulsion or some form of 'brain washing'".¹⁰⁰ and so is not repulsed by Lee's undemocratic methods. Indeed Cairns' whole approach could have been modelled on the practices of the Peoples' Action Party. Speaking in Canberra in 1967, Singapore's Minister for the Interior outlined a plan for "combating communist political subversion before it has developed into armed revolt"¹⁰¹, which is substantially the same as Cairns' concern to prevent the "transition of bad economic and political situations into disorder."¹⁰² According to the minister, "the first and most important pre-requisite to success is, I regret to say, an efficient secret police . . . whose main function . . . is the penetration of all Communist open-front mass organisations. The second function of the secret police is to arrest and detain key united front leaders at suitable times." So far these have been before elections and before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. These arrests must take place before the detainee has been able 'to engage in overtly illegal action'. Whitlam believes that "Australian advisors can build up provincial police forces and a civil service structure."¹⁰³ This is but one form of the civilian aid he plans to send in place of military assistance.

E. Aid

It is unsatisfactory for Caucasian, Christian, North Atlantic nations to patronise those they can no longer dominate.
E. G. Whitlam 104

The use of foreign aid organizations such as A.I.D. as channels for CIA funds is but one, and probably the least effective, instance of the involved inter-relationship between foreign aid and the

⁹⁷ J. F. Cairns, *Silence Kills*, Melbourne, 1970, pp. 90-1.
⁹⁸ *Australian*, 16 January, 1970.

⁹⁹ Address to American-Australian Association, p. 4.
¹⁰⁰ *Economics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 25-6.

¹⁰¹ Goh Keng Swee, 'The Nature and Appeals of Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries', in John Wilkes (ed.), *Communism in Asia—A Threat to Australia?* Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1967.
Cf. Keith Buchanan, 'Speeding up the Social Revolution in Asia', *Monthly Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 5, October, 1969.

¹⁰² *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 13 August, 1964, p. 237. This has been a long-standing and widely applied view of Cairns' as can be seen from this 1947 quotation: 'We can save ourselves from the extremes of revolution or reaction, not by slowing down our reforms to a walking pace, not by using time and energy in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable until

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹² *Beyond Vietnam*, p. 35.

⁹³ *Australia—Base or Bridge?*, p. 12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15; repeated *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 26 March, 1968, p. 463.

⁹⁵ Barnard, *Australia's Defence*, p. 34; Whitlam, 1969 Policy Speech.

⁹⁶ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 7 April, 1970, p. 753; 1969 Policy Speech, p. 24; *Beyond Vietnam*, p. 46.

exploitation of the deformed economies of Asia. Whitlam has made it explicit that he proposes to use Australian aid for some of the other, more effective methods of economic domination. His pamphlet *Beyond Vietnam* has a section headed 'Trade-Aid' and he is particularly keen on Bilateral Aid in the form of Bonus Exports credit since it "cuts the cost of grants in foreign exchange" and "has attractive possibilities as a basis for future export promotion".¹⁰⁵ He is also keen to direct aid towards the cities, since "The war in Vietnam was lost on the day it was decided to ignore the needs of the leading cities".¹⁰⁶ In general Whitlam sees Australia providing "not only military co-operation but, most importantly, social and economic co-operation".¹⁰⁷ In this way he expects to overcome the problems which Sir Allen Fairhall, the then Minister for Defence, said Australia faced:

We are likely to see 'peoples' wars of liberation of the type promoted in Vietnam This is the kind of war in which we will be increasingly concerned — not only with the military, but also with the political, economic and psychological aspects of war, for which I believe Western nations are at present ill-prepared.¹⁰⁸

This will not mean abandoning a military role, but using the military in new and imaginative ways especially in the people who implement the Aid programmes as has been the case at the Armed Forces Vehicle Rebuild Workshop at Kong Sit near Bangkok¹⁰⁹ and after the style of the military civil aid team in South Vietnam.¹¹⁰

the generated pressures are too great to resist, but by leading public opinion in the way that sound scientific investigation of social conditions reveals that it should go' (*Meanjin*, Vol. VI, 1947, p. 267).

¹⁰⁸ *Australia—Base or Bridge?*, p. 10. They would have to remain as

advisors since to use any foreign troops as civilian police would be 'extraordinarily destructive' (*Beyond Vietnam*, p. 38).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1. Whitlam is particularly keen on the International Development Association which was set up to frustrate the demands of the poorer nations for a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). According to Sir Robert Jackson, US opposition was based on the fear that SUNFED would be dominated by the recipients (*The Case for an International Development Authority*, Syracuse University Press, 1959, p. 11); also H. K. Jacobson, 'The Changing United Nations', in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds), *Foreign Policy in the Sixties*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965. The IDA is a section of the World Bank and contains no communist members. Since 1968 IDA has lent Indonesia more than \$66m.

¹⁰⁶ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 5 November, 1968, p. 2429-30. This is the reverse of Mac's dictum but in line with Samuel P. Huntington's scheme to win in Vietnam by 'urbanising' the entire population ('The Bases of Accommodation', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 4, July, 1968).

¹⁰⁷ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 7 April, 1970, p. 754. This is what Roger Hilsman describes as 'Orchestrating the Instrumentalities' ('Plea for "Realism" in Southeast Asia', *New York Times Magazine*, 23 August, 1964+).

¹⁰⁸ *Age*, 8 July, 1969.

¹⁰⁹ *Beyond Vietnam*, p. 33.

Under an ALP government Australian aid would centre on Indonesia. In 1966 Whitlam told a Sydney audience that "The new government of Indonesia is well disposed towards this country. It is our obligation and in our interest to see that we render all the political, diplomatic and economic support we can".¹¹¹ Cairns was critical of the generals in March, 1966, but by October he saw them as a national, confident force; on both occasions he was relieved that Indonesia was anti-communist.¹¹² Whitlam's attitude has never varied and in April, 1970, he told the Parliament that

It cannot be said too often that the basis of regional co-operation in our neighbourhood is Indonesia; it cannot be said too often that defence arrangements which exclude or by-pass Indonesia are completely unbalanced.¹¹³

Consequently he much prefers ASEAN to ASPAC which contains neither Indonesia nor Singapore.¹¹⁴ Moreover, Indonesia runs parallel to the 'air and sea' line Cairns wants drawn to the east and to the west of Darwin and is recognised by Alastair Buchan, formerly of the Institute for Strategic Studies, and hence by Lance Barnard, as our national barrier.¹¹⁵

There are a number of strands in the ALP's overall strategy for counter-revolution: the US, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand and Indonesia to mention a few. Of course, none of these countries are blocks of wood to be moved around like dominoes. There is no reason to suppose that they will all simultaneously acquiesce in

¹¹⁰ *Australia's Defence*, p. 42.

¹¹¹ *Australia—Base or Bridge?*, p. 11. Historically the ALP's attitude towards Indonesia has been variable to say the least. The story began with the Scullin Government handing back three survivors of perhaps the only successful escape from Tanah Merah Camp in NEI, in denial of all humanity and asylum traditions. On 10 March, 1942, Curtin welcomed the Flying Dutchman, Dr. Van Mook (Acting Governor-General, NEI; former Police President in Batavia, head of the NEI Government-in-Exile in Australia) in the spirit of trade union mateship. Towards the end of the war there was an implicit assumption that the *status quo ante* would be re-established in NEI. Pratt's policy was far from anti-imperialist and he worked for accommodation. The West Irian crisis gave Arthur Calwell some of his finest hours as he read the speeches which *Sydney Morning Herald* journalists provided. The upshot of his hue and cry was that Menzies was forced to spend money on defence. Out of Calwell's hysteria came the F111 and conscription. I am indebted to Rupert Lockwood for these details and eagerly await his book on the subject. See also R. Gailley 'Prelude to Vietnam', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, March, 1971, Vol. II, No. 1.

¹¹² *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 22 March, 1966, p. 452; 11 October, 1966, p. 1561.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 7 April, 1970, p. 754.

¹¹⁴ *Beyond Vietnam*, p. 39.

¹¹⁵ *Australia's Defence*, p. 13; Whitlam told a TV interview in Brisbane that he could envisage circumstances in which he would commit Australian troops to defend Indonesia (*Australian*, 10 November, 1970).

the ALP's planning and so new elements in the strategy will have to emerge. Labor's strategy will remain incomplete for as long as it is out of office but there is still sufficient evidence to indicate how the gaps will be filled. For additional guidance we should look closely at the technocratic Labor governments which have already come to power — Wilson in Britain and Dunstan in South Australia. Moreover, it should be recalled that no Labor Party in office has ever acted more radically than its pre-announced policies so that what has been outlined here is the least to be expected. It remains to pay some attention to one additional feature of the strategy, namely, the parliamentary road to neo-capitalism.

F. Parliamentarism

I don't care which way they vote — yes, I favor the voting age being dropped to 18—but I want to convince them they can achieve something without throwing stones and petrol bombs. I want to see the youth movement understand its position, and I want the bad element kept out.
J. F. Cairns 116

Within Australia the ALP intends to contain protest and to direct it towards the parliamentary system. Cairns never tires of pointing to parliament as the epicentre of power in our society:

If the student generation is to change anything it will need not only to hold tenaciously to its commitment to humane or moral values, but it will have to stop disenfranchising itself. Politics appears to be amoral. But no more than society as a whole. Nothing can be gained by boycotting politics in the belief that protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience can do the job and politics can't. Unless sufficient of the new generation goes into the political machine it won't achieve more than its disillusioned predecessors. Unless it realises that changes have to be made in the way that schools, universities, factories, banks, newspapers, television stations and governments departments, and police forces, are run then it will achieve no more than its predecessors. All the thoughts of the new protesting generation have been thought before. Unless they are channelled into politics and unless politics is made to change the way society is run then the old order will have yet another victory.¹¹⁷

It is interesting to note that Cairns defines politics as parliamentary politics and places this above the banks, TV stations, etc. Or as he put it on another occasion: "Parliament is still the most effective way to attain" a situation where the fundamental welfare of the people is attained." Parliament is the only real and effective way to achieve all these necessary changes".¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ *Herald*, 24 July, 1968.

¹¹⁷ *The Asian Revolution and Australia*, pp. 188-9.

¹¹⁸ 'The Labor Movement and Socialism', *Broadside*, 7 August, 1969, p. 11; *Non-Violent Power*, April, 1970, p. 8. The continuing leftward shift of

But he is not content to direct protest towards parliament. He has made it quite clear that he wants to contain protest. Defending his intended absence from parliament to attend the May 1970 Moratorium in Melbourne, he told the House of Representatives that he wanted the protest to be "democratic . . . peaceful . . . and *inoffensive*"; "and I want to be in Melbourne on 8th May to do everything I can to make it into those things. If I am here in Canberra I cannot do that".¹¹⁹

This statement of intent pales into insignificance beside the admissions made in the same debate by T. Uren, MHR for Reid. These are so remarkable that they need only be quoted in full to remove the necessity for comment:

During the visit of Air Vice-Marshal Ky to Australia there was what was probably one of the biggest demonstrations ever held in Sydney. The demonstrators met at the base of the northern pylon of the Sydney Harbour Bridge. The then Leader of the Opposition, the right honourable member for Melbourne (Mr. Calwell), addressed the meeting after which there was a march towards Kirribilli House. It had been pre-arranged with the police that the demonstrators would walk along the footpath past Kirribilli House and return to the base of the northern pylon on the Sydney Harbour Bridge. Because of political decisions outside the control of the police it was decided that the demonstrators would not be allowed to pass the barricades at Kirribilli House. Elements among the demonstrators wanted to take action and rush the barricades. I suggest that if honourable members are interested they read an account of this affair in *The Bulletin*, which has never been a friend of mine. Honourable members know that I have been successful in lengthy litigation against *The Bulletin*. *Mr. Speaker*—Order! The honourable member is getting a bit we want to try to ensure that demonstrations will be peaceful.¹²⁰

But I must explain our position—our responsibility. If honourable members read that newspaper they will see that as a member of the Parliament and a responsible person interested in ensuring non-violence I took action to lead the men away from the barricades. I did not want them to come into direct contact with the police which may have ended in violence. What we are now saying—and I am not

the protest movement has forced Cairns to modify his parliamentarism. Instead of influencing schools, factories and environments through parliament, he now advises taking direct charge of these but 'a small piece at a time'. Foreward to Joe Harris, *The Bitter Fight*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1970, p. vi.

¹¹⁹ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 16 April, 1970, p. 1236; emphasis added. The Melbourne *Sun* (19 September, 1970) carried a report of the second moratorium headed 'PC Cairns' to the Rescue'. For further comment on this incident, see *Vanguard* (Melbourne), 21 January 1971; cf. *Meanjin*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1970, p. 502.

talking for myself only but for all Opposition members—is that we want to ensure that we demonstrate within the law.¹²⁰

It is worth recalling that most Labor MPs did not demonstrate at all; having put their signatures to a call for a moratorium for Friday, 8th May, all but half-a-dozen went on with business as usual. The half-dozen who honoured their pledges acted as special constables.

As a parliamentary party anxious, even desperate, for electoral reward, the ALP has either avoided Vietnam or attempted to manipulate it for political advantage in much the same way as the L.C.P. has. An examination of Whitlam's major extra-parliamentary speeches from 1967 to 1969 reveals an almost total blackout on Vietnam. In addresses to the United Postal Clerks and Telegraphers (22 May, 1967), to the SA Branch of the ALP (10 June, 1967), to the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union (27 November, 1967) and at the dinner of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council (9 March, 1968), he made no mention of it. His 1968 Poulter Memorial Lecture opens with the assertion that 'The anguish of Prague does not absolve us from concern about the agony of Vietnam', but he made only one further reference to it in twenty-five pages! Nor did he mention it at the Lowe and Gwydir campaign openings (16 and 23 May 1969), and it gained only a passing reference at Bendigo (19 May, 1969). Of over twenty sets of speakers' notes issued in conjunction with the ALP's 1966 election campaign only six contained material on Vietnam; one of these was four lines and another five lines long. On 21 October, 1966, a special issue solely on Vietnam appeared but it ignored the war and played games with quotations from government spokesmen. The official publication of the 'left-wing' Queensland branch of the ALP is called *Trend* and apart from a couple of reviews and one short article in May, 1970, it has ignored Vietnam. Barnard expressed the wish that the 1969 election be fought on domestic issues and recalled the near-victory of 1961 when this had been the case.¹²¹ There has been an almost complete reluctance to educate the party's rank-and-file on these issues.

Cairns has shown no such reluctance, but it is necessary to remember why he thinks this debate is required. Government policies in Vietnam 'have failed and have brought the threat of Communism and insurrection closer to Australia'. 'You can win these things only by considering objectively and accurately the circumstances with which you are dealing.'¹²² And again,

No one can hope to win in South Vietnam unless the record is good. It has not been good. Therefore, we may not win.

¹²⁰ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 16 April, 1970, p. 1244-5.

¹²¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 22 September, 1969.

¹²² *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 13 August, 1964, p. 236.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 19 August, 1965, p. 303.

We can win only if the record is good. If it is to become good, we must know where it has been bad.¹²³

So on his own admission his public campaign on Vietnam is part of his entire counter-revolutionary project. If the communists are to be defeated, new policies are needed but for these to come into effect public opinion must change so as to demand different and more sophisticated methods.

Within parliament itself there has been evasion and mockery. In October, 1967, 'Whitlam deliberately avoided an opportunity to debate (and therefore oppose) in Parliament the government's announcement of the assignment of an additional fifteen hundred men to Vietnam'.¹²⁴ In 1970 Barnard moved a motion on Cambodia which called for the removal of a list of foreign troops but said nothing about the Americans. This farce resulted from a piece of pseudo-cleverness: the motion followed the wording of a press report of a speech by Gorton in Japan.¹²⁵ Indeed most of the speeches which ALP leaders are forced to make in the House on Vietnam are little more than a collection of quotations from government statements or interminable legal or procedural quibbles. It is appropriate to recall Brian Fitzpatrick's judgement of the ALP at the time of the Crimes Act over a decade ago:

... the theme sung there again and again was: 'How can we oppose Barwick's Bill? ... Wouldn't it be better to let it go through, and then fought every case under it, tooth and nail? Brian, won't you tell your left-wing friends to think of us? That we'll stand by them when it comes to the point? But not in *Parliament*, not just now!' ¹²⁶

To sum up: at worst, the ALP can be pictured as possessing a conscious strategy for counter-revolution in Asia; at best it can be said to be putty in the hands of counter-revolutionaries. The truth does not lie somewhere between these extremes but each is true for particular issues, while the dynamic is towards a complete articulation of a counter-revolutionary strategy along lines demonstrated above. A Federal Labor government would work for a permanent arms sector in the Australian economy along neo-capitalist lines, and for neo-colonialism in Asia and TPNG. While Labor's leading spokesmen express certain disagreements in emphasis they are nonetheless united in their strategic concerns. Let those who want their policies support the ALP.

¹²⁴ Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 94.

¹²⁵ *C.P.D.*, H. of R., 8 May, 1970, p. 1914: nothing need be said of Bryant's proposals for the 'defence' of the Mayor of Phnom Penh.

¹²⁶ Brian Fitzpatrick, *A Future or No Future*, Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1966, p. 26.