

SIXTEEN

Unionists

'United to relieve, not combined to injure'

Motto adopted by the Australian Union Benefit Society, 1834

Although the wording of the Union Benefit Society's motto was amended to 'Defence not Défiance', this spirit remained unchanged in its domination of nineteenth-century unionism in Australia. Before 1880, almost all unions in Australia were craft and/or benefit societies. Provision of social services was as much a part of their function as were relations with employers. This relief work demanded that only tradesmen be admitted, because they were less likely to be a drain on unemployment relief funds. Even the possession of a trade was not always sufficient to gain membership: the Amalgamated Society of Engineers protected its welfare reserves by refusing to accept some applicants because they wore spectacles. Similarly, they refused benefits to any member whose illness was 'occasioned by drunkenness or fighting or any disease improperly contracted'. Most importantly, benefit funds could not be allowed to run down as a result of strikes. Union welfare schemes acted as a brake on militancy, though this limit was hardly necessary given the social outlook of the unions.

Although unionism was 'illegal' in Australia for most of the nineteenth century, the relevant provisions of the Master and Servants Acts and the Common Law conspiracy statutes were

rarely applied to prevent union organisation. Indeed, union demands were sometimes supported by government intervention. During the 1856 stonemasons' strike for an eight-hour day, government representatives threatened one of Melbourne's two major builders with prosecution for breach of contract if the strike held up work on the Houses of Parliament. The builder immediately agreed to the union's terms.

Enforcement of a 'White Australia policy' resulted in an even stronger united front of unions and governments. In 1878 Queensland threatened the Union Steamship Co. with the loss of a £10 000 mail contract if it persisted with its plans to replace European seamen with Asians. In their turn, the Seamen's Union offered 'To assist by every legitimate means in their power the police in the execution of their duty, and if necessary to arrest all of their comrades who violate the law'. N. B. Nairn enumerated the 'socially responsible' attitudes of the New South Wales Trades and Labor Council from 1870 to 1890.

Respectability was the keynote of union organisation, especially where union membership was just one more way by which the urban tradesman could ensure that improvement of social standing so dear to his heart. This attitude was pronounced in the printing trade, where the Victorian Typographical Association's journal emphasised 'display of learning, musical accomplishment and abstemious living'. As late as 1902, it declined to participate in politics.

Temperance played an important role in the social fabric of nineteenth-century Australia, and not without results; although the population doubled in the last thirty years of the century, the consumption of spirituous beverages in New South Wales went up by only 25 per cent. Early radicals such as Charles Harpur were lifelong campaigners for total abstinence, gaining the support of both the Protestant and the Catholic clergy. One incentive for building the Melbourne Trades Hall in 1857 was the objection of members to meeting

in hotels. This influence remained strong in the labour movement well into the 1930s. Regular resolutions called for restrictions on the 'grog' trade. In 1916 the *Worker* wrote:

Nothing short of nationalisation and then total abolition as laid down in the Labor Party's platform will adequately meet the case. Six o'clock closing, however, will doubtless be a step nearer the goal, and because of that let's have it ... but nationalisation's the thing.

Brewing interests reacted shrewdly. Their method of defeating 'prohibition' was to unite with the socialists in a call for the nationalisation of breweries. American experience showed prohibition to be a real threat. Acute understanding of the Labor Party turned 'nationalisation' into an insurance policy for the breweries.

A study of temperance movements in the United States, *Symbolic Crusade*, by Joseph R. Gusfield, observed:

Abstinence was becoming a symbol of middle-class membership and a necessity for ambitious and aspiring young men. It was one of the ways society could distinguish the industrious from the ne'er-do-well; the steady worker from the unreliable drifter; the good credit risk from the bad gambler ...

Seen in this way, temperance bears a resemblance to the piano; both were outward signs of an inner striving, although the former was a means to that end, and the latter evidence of its attainment.

Although relations between 'masters' and 'men' were rarely harmonious, they were conducted on a direct personal basis. A few unions admitted employers as honorary members. Joint action by manufacturers and their employees to secure a protective tariff was another force binding them together. Most of the overtures for this cooperation came from the employees.

The degree of amicability reached in employer-employee relations was possible in the skilled trades because of a pros-

perous economic environment and the largely pre-industrial nature of production. Metallurgy was one of the few areas with any degree of industrialisation but, as has been shown in the chapter on 'Diggers', various economic and ideological factors undercut the development of working-class consciousness even here.

W. G. Spence's association with the Amalgamated Miners Association (AMA) has led it to be categorised as one of the 'new unions', which broke through and away from the narrower guidelines and membership provisions. Whatever the explanation, the claim is unjustified since all Spence did was to bring together the existing local societies. The bias of the AMA's activities before 1890 can be seen from the allocation of its expenditure: £6600 on strike relief and over £100 000 on accident and funeral benefits.

Typical of the unionists whom Spence united were those who formed the Miners' Protective League at Lambing Flat late in 1861, when they agreed to police the goldfields and to hand over to the authorities any criminal they apprehended. They also planned to promulgate the word of God throughout their district.

Religious influences were particularly strong among Cornish miners in South Australia. A strike meeting there in 1874 began with the Wesleyan hymn 'And are we yet alive', and ended with the doxology and benediction. A thanksgiving service marked the strike's settlement.

Most miners had been self-employed and retained many of their old attitudes and aspirations: union leaders at Mt Lyell (Tasmania) advocated that their members work hard and buy shares. Just as the militant shearers were often frustrated smallholders, some of the mining activists were failed mine-owners. Dick Sleath, union secretary at Broken Hill in 1892, had been a company promoter and provisional director of the defunct Broken Hill Smelting and Refining Company. (Sleath was later sentenced to two years gaol, then became a

Labor M.L.A., only to lose preselection in 1901 and stand as an independent.)

The achievement of the AMA in unionising Australia's miners was far from conclusive. Only a fifth of the Gympie miners were members in 1890, and Australia-wide the figure was less than half in 1900. Tom Mann reported that, in the period 1905-09, there were no unionists at Gympie, Mt Morgan or Port Pirie, while those at Broken Hill, prior to his visit, were few and fragmented. This picture could be repeated for every sector of the workforce, with the possible exception of the coal-miners.

Coal-mining could be expected to develop 'industrial unionism' before other industries because coal itself is a necessary precondition for industrialisation. Despite the dangerous and onerous nature of the work, and persistently rapacious provocation by the mine-owners, the miners themselves were only marginally less reluctant than the workforce at large to accept the implications of their position under capitalism.

Doubly-damned convicts, including Castle Hill rebels, were Australia's first coal-miners. These men were slaves in every sense of the word. The free labourers who succeeded them benefited from the general labour shortage in the colony. When mine-owners sought to overcome this problem by importing indentured labour from Britain, they found that the new arrivals

soon broke their engagements, and quitted the coal fields. Similarly, miners often celebrated their arrival by striking for higher wages, despite the fact that the agents in Britain were instructed to ensure that their recruits were of a type unlikely to cause trouble when they arrived in the colony.

Gold discoveries made the miners even more demanding: in 1853 a shipload of migrants struck for an increase of 4s a ton for getting coal. The strike failed because the old hands refused to lend their support.

Strikes in the 1860s did not lead immediately to an im-

provement in union organisation or interest. One secretary claimed that he took office 'because he thought he might as well have the two pounds per quarter as anyone else'. Cooperative ventures were encouraged, but for reasons of profit as much as in solidarity.

James Fletcher, president of the miners' union, started a cooperative mine in 1861. Thirteen years later, he claimed that the interests of capital and labour were identical and hoped that the men would always recognise this fact in their union activities. Fletcher was by no means the typical miner: he later became a proprietor, owner of the *Newcastle Morning Herald* and was a member of the Legislative Assembly for ten years. His proposition concerning the unity of capital and labour was not the yelping of a worker trying to ingratiate himself with his masters. Rather, it articulated what many miners believed to be the facts of their calling.

In his studies of the New South Wales coal-miners, Robin Gollan showed that when the unions agreed to a sliding scale of payments for coal hewed, they accepted the intellectual position of their masters who reasoned that wages were a function of earnings. By accepting the proposition that their wages should rise and fall with company profits, the unions bound themselves in two ways. First, they denied themselves the right to struggle for a higher proportion of those profits. Secondly, the miners needed the price of coal to remain high, so that profits, and hence wages, would also be high. This link meant that the unions had an interest in maintaining their employers' oligopoly and price-fixing arrangements. As Gollan observed:

When in 1878 the Vend began to show signs of weakening, the union set itself to strengthen it. At first sight it may seem extraordinary that the union should attempt to prop up a monopolistic arrangement of employers, but in the circumstances of the time it was perfectly understandable.

This approach manifested itself in a dozen ways. Settlement of disputes in the 1870s rested with a council of five arbitrators,

two from each side and one mutually acceptable. The costs of this tribunal were shared equally by the union and the proprietors. Company officials were regularly invited to the miners' annual picnic, although it was rare for them to attend. In 1876 the union even authorised the spending of £12 on a retirement presentation to the superintendent of the AA Company. Their overtures were not reciprocated. Twelve months later, the owners declined to contribute to a testimonial for the dying union secretary, John Wood.

Perhaps because of coal's function for the emerging industrialisation of late-nineteenth-century Australia, it was inevitable that it would be the coal-miners who first experienced the more vigorous class relationships that were to mark the twentieth century. In almost every respect, the miners' experiences prefigured those of the rest of the labour movement. They felt the force of state intervention in 1888 when Gatling guns were ranged against them and some of their leaders gaolled in the first 'political' prosecutions since Eureka. They returned their union secretary, James Curley, to parliament in 1889, two years before there was a Labor Party. They spoke up for a kind of socialism by declaring in favour of 'the equal distribution of wealth'. They maintained this vanguard position throughout the ensuing decades to become one of the mainstays of proletarian consciousness in Australia. This precocity moved them outside the range of the present account.

Romantic nostalgia for the internationalism and class solidarity of nineteenth-century unionism reaches its zenith in discussions of the 1889 London dockers' strike, which was victorious, so the legend has it, because of the donation of £30 000 from the Australian unions. Three elements need to be added to this tale. First, the strike had the support of the London merchants, who were anxious 'to get rid of the medieval constitution of the port of London, the main cause of the decline in London's harbour trade'. This bourgeois backing extended to Australia. In Queensland, for instance, the Brisbane

waterside workers gave £150; the none-too-liberal premier, McIlwraith, gave £50 and other politicians a total of £236. The relief committee contained employers and unionists, the Lord Mayor undertaking its organisational responsibilities. Secondly, Engels judged that the Australian unions' donation was designed to 'ward off a sudden mass importation of English workers'. Finally, there is the fact that Australians, being richer, had always given large sums to Imperial collections, such as the relief of soldiers and their families who suffered in the Indian Mutiny and the Sudan campaign.

W. E. Murphy, who had been secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall, saw the donation as proof that Australia had indeed become 'A New Britannia'. Writing in the *Centennial Magazine* for February 1890, he claimed:

In future the working classes of Great Britain will have to do little beyond organising their strikes; the funds will be supplied from Australasia... just as Moses struck the rock and made the water flow, so will any appeal to the industrial democracy of Australia from a deserving class meet with ready response until victory is assured... until the poor down-trodden industrial serf of Great Britain is enabled to tread the soil of freedom with the elastic step of his Australasian brother.

SOLIDARITY — NEVER?

One feature of the strikes of 1890–94 was the ease with which they were broken by the superabundance of volunteer labour. All the employers' 'plots' in the world to smash unionism and maintain the principle of freedom of contract would have come to nought had there not been at least two volunteers ready to replace every striking unionist.

Spence claimed that 'Unionism came to the bushman as a religion', since 'It had in it that feeling of mateship which he understood already, and which always characterised the action of one "white man" to another'. This passage was used by

both Gollan and Ward. In his *History of the A.W.U.*, Spence offered a number of alternative explanations for the success of bush unions: 'It was the half-crown cut which enabled us to arouse and enrol men and lay the foundations of the organisation ...' (p. 15), and 'The organisers saved the Union from defeat. When they failed to reach a shed, in most cases it was lost' (p. 20).

By 1891 only about 5 per cent of the Australian workforce was unionised and of these more than half had joined in the preceding three years. In Australia in 1891 there were almost twice as many domestic servants as unionists. There was no general strike, only a great strike in comparison with what had gone before. Compared with what followed, the strikes of the 1890s gave little indication of labouring class solidarity.

Cardinal Moran certainly did not believe that the 1890 strikers were unreasonable or excessive in their demands, and he championed their cause to such effect that ten thousand of them responded to a call for 'Three cheers for the Cardinal' when a protest march passed St Mary's.

Respectability and responsibility had been the watchwords of the unions before 1890 and the strikes generally made little difference to their behaviour. Throughout 1890 the Australian Labour Federation (ALF) in Queensland (which according to Gollan was the stronghold of militancy) bent over backwards to reach accommodation with the pastoralists. The *Worker* for June 1890 reported that the Federation had 'offered to admit all non-unionists to bushmen's unions without penalty', that is, to overlook blacklegging. In addition, the general council paid £75 to a shipping company to reimburse it for expenses involved in sending some wool by another boat.

Nor did the situation alter much in 1891. William Lane defended the Federation from accusations of 'anarchistic agitation'. Socialism was purely a political matter. In its industrial activities, the Federation 'has consistently and persistently attempted to replace more violent methods of righting wrongs

by conciliation and arbitration'. Four months after 'the Rockhampton Twelve' had been sentenced to three years gaol for their alleged crimes at Peak Downs, Hinchcliffe, the ALF secretary, still desired 'to let bygones be bygones for errors are common to human nature and particularly of late among all classes in Queensland. The ALF is sorry for foolish utterances and acts which cannot in themselves be defended'. The 'errors' and 'foolish utterances' were not those of Mr Justice Harding, the trial judge who had chastised the police for their failure to suppress the strikers with sufficient vigour.

Mr Justice Harding: 'Do the police want to see a man's throat cut before they do anything? How do they act in this country? They seem to have no system. It's funny, very funny, indeed it's a nice pleasant country where such a state of things exists.'

The witness in reply to a question said there were four policemen present at the time.

The Judge: 'Let me see; they all had six-shooters. Four sixes are twenty-four; that would be twenty-four of them. There would not have been many who "boo-hooed" the second time if I had been one of them.'

Harding carried forward a tradition of British justice. In 1794, when one of the Scottish Martyrs urged that Jesus Christ had himself been a reformer, one of the judges chuckled: 'Muckle he made o' that; he was hanged'. Foster, who tried coal-miners in 1888, and Pring, who sent Peter Bowling (1909) to gaol in leg-irons, are other examples.

Further south, unionist feeling was equally temperate. By the time Arthur Rae had become an MLA, he had forgotten the fourteen-month gaol sentence that the squatters had arranged for him; he sought to assure them that they had nothing to fear from the introduction of the 'Single Tax'. Meanwhile, in Melbourne the Trades Hall Council declared its lack of concern for unemployed workers who were not trade unionists, a position both narrow and ultimately self-defeating since it

meant that the unemployed would have to become 'volunteer labourers' if they were to secure work.

Exceptions emerged to this pattern of passivity. The strikes passed through five phases: the maritime dispute of 1890, the shearers' strike of 1891, the Broken Hill 'lock-out' of 1892, another shearing strike in 1894, and another coal strike in 1896. After the first of these, the trade unions (in the sense in which these have been described above) withdrew into the docile activities from which they had never intended to stray.

The common feature of the post-1890 strikes is that they were not the creatures of the metropolitan-based trade unions. Here the similarity ended and each group — Queensland shearers, Broken Hill miners and New South Wales coal-miners — has to be analysed for its own dynamics. Such an investigation still needs to begin from the 1890 maritime dispute.

Fitzpatrick and others portrayed the strikes as a deliberate attempt by the employers to smash unionism in a period of economic depression. In this version, the bosses appear as the initiators. Undoubtedly, there were some employers who wanted this outcome; and even more of them thought it possible *after* the debacle of the maritime strike. But N. B. Nairn has shown that this explanation for the origins of the maritime strike is not plausible. First, the employers were seriously divided. Secondly, the pastoralists' unions had agreed to employ only union labour as from the 1891 season. Thus, concluded Nairn, it was not the pastoralists who plotted the strike. That responsibility rests upon the secretary of the Shearers' Union, W. G. Spence, who had grown overconfident and overanxious.

In order to terrify the pastoralists into bringing forward by one year (that is, to 1890) the institution of all-union sheds, Spence constructed a paper alliance of as many unions as he could. He did not intend to call a strike; his plan was to scare the pastoralists with his paper tiger. The unexpected happened when one of the unions that Spence had brought on side to bolster up the shearers became involved in a strike of its own.

So the shearers were on strike not to secure all-union sheds but in consequence of an alliance designed to work in the other direction, or rather, *not to work at all*.

Nairn established Spence as the prime mover. But what motivated him? Nairn hinted at pride, but these motives are neither explored nor are they convincing. If William Lane had done these things, one could accept megalomania as the explanation, but not with Spence, who from all accounts was a restrained, almost lenitive, unionist. Of course, personality does not rule out a temporary aberration. An alternative account disagrees with Nairn only on the point of Spence's motivation. Rather than picturing Spence as an adventurer, the alternative explanation shows Spence the moderate, that is, Spence in character.

Throughout 1889 Spence had toured Australia and New Zealand in an effort to contain rank-and-file moves against the pastoralists. In this attempt he was not alone. Similar problems were being confronted by Lane and Hinchcliffe's ALF in their dealings with the Queensland Shearers' Union which, at a mass meeting, rejected the 1890 agreement that the executive had made with the pastoralists. The shearers insisted that all-union sheds be introduced immediately, and in consequence declared wool from Jondaryn station 'black'. Although the ALF was forced to support the shearers in order to preserve the parliamentary edifice it was attempting to build, it also moved towards the establishment of machinery to keep the shearers in their place.

Details of the scheme were adopted by the Brisbane council of the ALF on 7 July 1890:

[The scheme] required every union to forward to its District Council conditions under which it would be ready to work for two years ... In the event of agreement, the ALF and the employers' associations were to police its provisions and proceed by joint action against any infringement.

Most of all, the ALF was anxious to avoid conflict with the

employers. At the ALF general council meeting on 1 August 1890, the following directive to the Shearers' Union was agreed upon:

That the General Council of the ALF deemed it unwise and impolitic for them [the QSU] to interfere with the Darling Downs agreement for the present year and request them to notify the squatters of the Darling Downs that while such an agreement was in direct contravention of the rule of the Union they were agreeable to allow members to remain as they were for the present season and urge for another conference before the commencement of the next shearing.

This groundswell also threatened Spence's concept of unionism. It was not Spence who would not wait until 1891 for all-union sheds, but the rank-and-file shearers. Spence attempted to bluff the pastoralists so that the pressure from below could be headed off.

Explaining Spence's impatience in this way pushes the question back a stage to ask, 'Why were the shearers militant?' Part of the answer must be the abominable living conditions provided on most of the stations. Also there was an increasing tendency to employ Chinese on the stations: QSU rules were strict on this point and excluded from membership not only the Chinese themselves but also any European who worked for anyone who employed a Chinese, had commercial dealings with a Chinese, or patronised any merchant or storekeeper who dealt with or employed Chinese. Underpinning all these issues was resentment against the peculiarities of the Queensland pastoral industry. Far more so than in New South Wales or Victoria, Queensland's inland properties were owned by a small number of men, many of whom represented British-based finance companies. The militancy of the Queensland shearers fed upon the rancour and enmity of frustrated smallholders towards large landowners.

After the employers realised how weak the unions were, and once the effects of the depression were felt, the bosses no

doubt provoked disputes in order to smash unionism. At Broken Hill in 1892 the companies terminated their agreement with the AMA; the men acted straightaway and a four-month strike resulted. When trade revived around 1896, the northern coal-miners embarked on unsuccessful strike action to restore the 1890 rates. Both strikes ended the same way: they were smashed because there was an oversupply of 'volunteer labour'. Most of those who struck were never re-employed at their old work places. Equally important, both strikes had been consciously undertaken by the workers to challenge their employers. Here were stirrings in the long haul towards the making of an Australian proletariat.

For the unionists, 1891 was the end of the old and not the beginning of the new. For the employers, it was the beginning of a 'get-tough' policy. In that respect it also inaugurated a new phase for some unionists. Most took almost two decades to accept this fact. This delay was partly because the old living standards did not collapse entirely. In 1907 Tom Mann concluded that 'a mechanic in Victoria, was quite seven shillings and sixpence a week better off, for one hour's work per day less, than a mechanic in England; and the unskilled labourer likewise had a higher standard'.

Jurgen Kuczynski highlighted the peculiar environment in which the Australian working class was reformed. Unlike the four other countries that he investigated (Britain, United States, Germany and India), the Australian working class developed in a society where 'the eight-hour day was the rule, modern machines were installed and these were worked principally by men, not primarily by women, and by children scarcely at all'. Moreover, the workers were enfranchised and some elementary defence organisations were at hand.

In spite of the hammering that the unions received from the state and from the employers during the strikes, their response was not to reject class cooperation. They concluded that the state must intervene even more, but that this intervention

should take the form of forcing the employers to sit down at a negotiating table. Compulsory arbitration became the panacea to restore the good old days before 1890.

Acceptance of compulsory arbitration by the labour movement was not achieved until 1895 when it was added to the New South Wales platform, but it had had its proponents long before then. New Zealand provided a working model for such a scheme when compulsory arbitration was introduced there in 1890. J. C. Watson, who spent most of his early life in New Zealand, was a strong advocate of the system, since it conformed with his view that Labor did not 'seek privileges from one section of the community at the expense of another'.

Such homilies were not confined to Watson. They were the stock in trade of 'socialists' who considered governmental action equal to socialism, and who rejected class struggle in both theory and practice. Hughes, for instance, praised the 1903 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act as 'a recognition by the people that a blow struck at any component part of the organism of society is a blow struck at society itself and destroys social peace'.

Federal Labor was supported in this outlook by the various state parties. Mention has already been made of the Queensland ALF's readiness to sacrifice the shearers' demands on the altar of arbitration. In New South Wales, Holman stated his party's attitude when he told the House of Assembly that arbitration substituted 'the force of law, which in its ultimate analysis is the regulated brute force of the community, for unregulated brute force'. Victorian Labour was somewhat less enthusiastic only because of that state's attachment to wages boards.

George Pearce in Western Australia claimed to have been inspired to demand compulsory arbitration by the New Zealand example. More likely, his ardour was stimulated by his abhorrence of the violence of the 1898-99 Fremantle waterfront strike. The first WA Trades and Labour Congress in 1899

accepted compulsory arbitration. The following year it resolved that 'any member of Parliament who by voting to close the session, or otherwise tries to block the passing of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration bill, will be looked upon as an enemy of Labor'. Tasmanian Labor voiced its enthusiasm when it criticised the 1910 Wages Board Act because it had not made arbitration compulsory. Kingstonian Liberals were responsible for the introduction of compulsory arbitration in South Australia, in which endeavour they had the support of the small Labor Party.

Labor endorsement of compulsory arbitration dovetailed with its support for protection and White Australia. The combination of these demands led the Party further and further into the thicket of state-backed schemes for class cooperation.

Even in the 1850s the case for protection was linked with calls for an eight-hour day. By the 1880s the *Bulletin* argued that protection was essential for the maintenance of a White Australia because it would limit competition from cheaper Asian labour. Arrangements for the protection of the sugar industry after the repatriation of island labourers brought these three forces into practical union.

Other Australian producers learnt from this example and 'some important employer groups were persuaded temporarily to cease or modify their traditional opposition to compulsory industrial tribunals'. By 1907 a virtual deal had been made between the employers and the labour movement: the manufacturers were to be protected by a tariff wall, and the workers by industrial arbitration Acts. This was the promise of the 'New Protection'. Only those employers who accepted certain union demands were to be entitled to protection; the employers soon repudiated this restriction and the direct connection between tariffs and wages was never effected. 'The employers got their protection: the union fell back to industrial tribunals.'

In November 1898 the Victorian Labor paper *Tocsin* had argued that

a minimum wage cannot continue to exist in a practical form unless in industries and forms of work which are protected either naturally or artificially against the competition of people who have not a minimum wage system. The doctrine of the Minimum Wage in all Protected Industries is practically of Australian invention, and, since it has begun to operate, places Protection in Australia in an altogether different footing from Protection in other countries.

The wellsprings of Labor support for compulsory arbitration were indicative of the non-class view of society that the Labor Party represented. The effects of arbitration reinforced this position. Mr Justice Piddington reported on 'the mental change wrought in [trade union officials] by constantly seeing and taking part in the judicial methods of investigation and consequent decree'. Some rank-and-file workers were won over by the seeming generosity of the Harvester Award in 1907 which, on paper, amounted to an almost 30 per cent pay rise in some cases.

These experiences 'engendered (or perhaps increased) a distaste and distrust of the methods of trial by force and a willingness to abandon them and abide by the methods of trial by reason and law'. For the unions as organisations, compulsory arbitration meant 'a general lowering of the fighting spirit of the membership', because more and more unionists were free-loaders. Eventually, compulsory arbitration became associated with the compulsory unionism that sustained the corrupt empires of the AWU.

PART THREE

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